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Introduction
The great awakening to individual rights sparked by the civil rights
movement of the fifties and sixties is permeating all the cracks and cor-
ners of law. The call for equality of individual rights and obligations
and the demand for recognition of the dignity and worth of each person's
contributions to society have reached family law. In particular, the in-
creased consciousness of sex discrimination in the law is forcing a new
look at how family law treats individuals.
The belief that the family is essential to the continuation of society
and government has long been unquestioned.' Obligations and rights
arising from the family relationship have been imposed by government
because they are deemed necessaary for the continuation of the family
unit and of civilized society itself.2 However, courts have refused to rec-
ognize that family obligations and family rights different from those they
impose might serve society as well or better. Few courts have dared to
state that the rights and obligations with which the common law courts
clothed husband and wife may not be the best means of furthering the
interests of the family group.
Today, for the first time, large numbers of persons are aware of what
only a few have long known: that the principles developed to protect
marriage and family as an institution are the most sex discriminatory in
all of law. When legal rights and duties are dependent upon the sex of
an individual without regard to the relevance of sex to the object of those
rights and duties, sex discrimination is being used unjustly as a legal tool.
This is exactly what the common law has done with regard to support
obligations between husband and wife.
This article will first examine the modern law of spousal support and
point out both the law's ineffectiveness in protecting the family unit and
the extent to which sex discrimination is used in the process. Second, the
article will propose a family partnership model as an alternative base for
determining support rights and duties between spouses. The essential
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'Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
2 Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939).
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purpose of the proposal is to give to the law of interspousal support a
means of strengthening the family unit while simultaneously according
equality of rights to both spouses.
I. THE LAW OF SUPPORT: SPOUSES LiVING TOGETHER
A. The Context of Support Obligations
Two concepts, Christian and feudal in origin, are basic to the develop-
ment of the law of support obligations in Anglo-American legal culture.
The first of these, "husband as head of the household," developed from
Jesus' "and they twain shall be one flesh," through the declarations of
St. Paul that the wife is subject to the husband,3 to Blackstone's state-
ment that by marriage, "the husband and wife are one person in law, that
is, the very being or legal existence of the women is suspended during
the marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband under whose wing, protection, and care, she performs every-
thing."4 The secular American courts soon recognized that marriage "...
is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public is
deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and of society,
without which there would be neither civilization nor progress."5  To
preserve the marriage institution they applied the church-developed law
of marriage as set out by Blackstone whose Commentaries was probably
the most widely available law book in the country. An excellent general
outline of the dimensions of the legally imposed rights and obligations
of husband and wife was given by the Ohio supreme court in 1870:
Whatever may be the reason of the law, the rule is maintained, "that
the legal existence of the wife is merged in that of the husband, so that,
in law, the husband and wife are one person."
The husband's dominion over the person and property of the wife is
fully recognized. She is utterly incompetent to contract in her own
name. He is entitled to her society and her service; to her obedience
and her property. All her personal chattels are absolutely his, and her
choses in action when reduced to his possession, and the right to so re-
duce them is at his will and pleasure. He has an unqualified right to
the use of her realty during coverture, and an estate for life, in the
event of her death, if she bear him a child born alive, etc.
3 See, e.g., Virginia Ry. & Power Co. v. Gorsuch, 120 Va. 655, 661-662, 91 S.E. 632, 634
(1917).
4W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 445 (1813). Since numerous other Christian coun-
ties apply community property concepts of equality in marriage, researchers attribute accep-
tance of these particular concepts to the economic system in feudalism. See W. DEFUNIAX,
& M. VAUGHN, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY (2d ed. 1971); Sayre, A Recon-
sideration of Husband's Duty to Support and IWife's Duty to Render Services, 29 VA. L REV.
857 (1943).
-5 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211.
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In consideration of his marital rights the husband is bound to fur-
nish the wife a home and suitable support. He owes her protection,
and is liable for her debts contracted before marriage.0
The Married Women's Property Acts passed in all states during the
19th Century gave the married woman control over her own earnings and
property at law, but it did not affect any of the other rights and duties
flowing from the concept of merger which the law had imposed upon the
parties in marriage." In particular, the husband remained the essence
of the household.8 This concept of husband as head of the household
remains intact in most states;9 it is solidified in some by statutes which
state that "The husband is the head of the family."'10 The husband has
power and responsibility to determine the standard of living of the fam-
ily, where they shall live, how the household shall be managed and how
the children shall be raised.1 Only through divorce or separation is an
indirect limit placed on the husband's arbitrary power to govern the
household as he sees fit. The law gives the husband "almost unbounded
6Phillips v. Graves, 20 Ohio St. 371, 380 (1870).
7 Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humble, 181 U.S. 57, 63 (1901); Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co,,
93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915); State v. Phillips, 85 Ohio St. 317, 97 N.E. 976 (1912);
Plummer v. Trost, 81 Mo. 425 (1884); Johnston, Jr., Sex and Property: The Common Law
Tradition, The Law School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U.L
REV. 1033 (1972); Younger, Community Property, Women and the Law School Curriculum,
48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 211 (1973); Warren, Husband's Right to Wile's Services, 38 HARV. L.
REV. 421 and 622 (1925).
8 There is a general consensus of opinion that the family existed before the state, and
that autocratic family government was the first of all forms of government. It
seems to have been regarded as an axiom by publicists for centuries that the family
was the basis of the state, and that destruction of the family would be the destruction
of the state. To insure the unity and preservation of the family, there seemed to
be thought necessary a complete identity of interests, and a single head with control
and power. The husband was made that head, and given the power, and in return
was made responsible for the maintenance and conduct of the wife.
Haggett v. Hurley, 40 A. 561, 563 (Sup. Jud. Ct. Me. 1898).
9 Fallon v. Fallon, 111 N.J. Eq. 512, 162 A. 406 (1932). In Howell v. Ohio Casualty
Insurance Co., 124 N.J. Super. 414, 307 A.2d 142 (1973), a New Jersey court criticized
the doctrine of merger but did not attempt to abrogate or declare it invalid. See discussion
in W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 859 (4th ed. 1971) describing the struggle to recognize
that merger no longer bars interspousal tort actions.
10 OHIo REv. CODE § 3103.02 (Page 1972); CAL. CIV. CODE § 5101 (West 1970).
"1See, Fallon v. Fallon, supra, n. 9; McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Neb. 226, 59 NW,2d
336 (1953); Sprinkle v. Ponder, 233 N.C. 312, 64 S.E.2d 171 (1951); Perry V. Perry, 93
Cal. App. 2d 720, 209 P.2d 847 (1949); Commonwealth v. George, 358 Pa. 118, 56 A2d
228 (1948); Town of Milton v. Bruse, 111 Vt. 82, 10 A.2d 203 (1940); Eddleman v, Ed.
dleman, 183 Ga. 766, 189 S.E. 833 (1937); Neville v. Neville, 220 Ala. 57, 124 So. 107
(1929); Cassidy v. Constantine, 269 Mass. 56, 168 N.E. 169 (1929); Garboctowskl v. State,
32 Del. 386, 123 A. 395 (1923); Spafford v. Spafford, 199 Ala. 300, 74 S. 354 (1917);
Brewer v. Brewer, 79 Neb. 726, 113 N.W. 161 (1907); Richardson v. Stuesser, 125 WIs.
66, 103 N.W. 261 (1905); Baker v. Carter, 83 Me. 132, 21 A. 891 (1890). For a general
discussion see L. KANoWITz, WOMEN AND THE LAW 46-52 (19(, Y.
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discretion as to expenditures and style of living' 1 -2 and establishes the
first parameter of any right to support that either spouse may have from
the other.
The second legally imposed consequence of marriage is that the hus-
band is entitled to the wife's services in the home and that she is obli-
gated to give those services without compensation.' These services in-
clude both the duty to render manual labor in the home as well as the
duty to cohabit and provide sexual services.' 4 The English ecclesiastical
courts provided a remedy to enforce the husband's right to services in the
form of an order to perform conjugal obligations or be excommuni-
cated." Today legal consequences of this obligation are more indirect.
The question most often arises in claims by the husband for loss of con-
sortium when a tortfeasor has injured the wife. Again and again courts
recognize that the cause of action is in the husband for' loss of household
services by the wife and hold that the legislation giving married women
control of their earnings did not abrogate this right.'0
These services of the wife in the household in the discharge of her do-
mestic duties, in the care of the home and in the education and rearing
of the children, belonged to the husband.... This right has not been
abridged or affected by the legislation which has abrogated the common
law disabilities of the wife. . . .The services for which the wife may
now recover compensation in her own name ... are services other
than those rendered in the discharge of her household and domestic
duties .... 17
Only a few years ago the Ohio supreme court explained this ancient
concept by stating that under the common law a wife was not a person
legally but "at most a superior servant to her husband...." She was "...
12 Crozier, Marital Support, 15 BOSTON U. L. REV. 28, 33-34 (1935).
13 Fallon v. Fallon, supra n. 9; Commonwealth v. George, supra n. 11.
14 See, H. PILPEL AND T. ZAVIN, YOUR MARRIAGE AND THE LAW 64 (1964); Bishop,
Divorce and the Bedroom, 8 J. FAM. L. 361 (1968); cases collected in Annor., 88 A.LR. 2d
553 (1963).
15 When that failed to render one Sarah Holmes properly submissive, the authorities in
1778 requested the temporal courts to "take and imprison the Body of Sarah Holmes that they
whom the Fear of God will not reclaim for evil ways your Majesty's Animadversion may force
and compell .. " G.I.O. DUNCAN, THE HIGH COURT OF DELEGATES 284 (1971).
16Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humble, supra n. 7; Tryon v. Casey, 416 S.W.2d 252 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1967); Warren, Husband's Right to wife's Services, supra n. 7.
IT Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 103-104, 112 N.E. 204, 205 (1915). In
recent years numerous courts have recognized that a wife also has an action for loss of the
husband's companionship due to injury. The court in Clouston v. Remlinger, 22 Ohio St. 2d
55, 258 N.E.2d 230 (1970), cites many cases in overruling the law which denied this cause
)f action in Smith v. Nicholas Bldg. Co. Although the Ohio court recognized the outdated
nature of the concepts that the wife owed services to the husband, but was not harmed by
njury to him, it stated no dicta indicating that the wife could claim for loss of her own set-
ices in the household.
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only a chattel with no personality, no property, and no legally recognized
feelings or rights.""'
Since services in the home are presumptively owed to the husband,
the woman who does earn money by tasks such as sewing for a fee or
taking in boarders in her home may find that the income is her husband's,
subject to execution by the husband's creditors or collectible only by the
husband or his estate.'" Even when the wife performs services in her
husband's business, there is some question as to whether she can recover
compensation. A typical decision held that a wife working in her hus-
band's business would be an employee for purposes of workmen's com.
pensation only if her labor was not of a nature generally required by the
marriage relationship.2 For an employment relationship to exist, the
husband and wife must not only have power to contract with one another
but the services rendered must be ones not already required as marital
duties of the wife.
In applying to legal controversies the concept that a wife's services
were owed to the husband by virtue of entering the marriage, the courts
were reflecting a cultural truism. The culturally defined role of wife was
to contribute to the marital unit by performance of household services."
That role was once of great value to the family and to society.
For centuries, in Judeo-Christian society, "woman's work" was the
entire preparation of food, the production of household utensils, gar-
ments, and necessities (soap, medicines, candles, etc.), the care of farm
animals, and to a large extent, work in the fields (agriculture). These
and a host of other roles (together with mothering a vast brood of chil-
dren) were "woman's work." . . . Woman was the first ind1tjrialslst
In terms of child bearing, production of commodities, production of
clothing and food, and management of the home, the wife was directly
contributing to the maintenance of the family. However, neither law nor
economics recognized the value of that contribution in traditional mone.
tary terms. The most that was acknowledged was a reciprocal duty upon
the husband to support the wife. The duties, though, were reciprocal,
not equal. Crozier analyzed the situation in biting terms:
18 Clouston v. Remlinger, 22 Ohio St. 2d 65, 72-74, 258 N.E.2d 230, 234-235 (1070),
19See, Plummer v. Trost, 81 Mo. 425 (1884); cases discussed In Warren, Husband'
Right to Services, supra n. 7.
2 0 Reid v. Reid, 216 Iowa 882, 249 N.W. 387 (1933).
21 See, Paulsen, Support Rights and Duties Between Husband and lVi/e, 9 VAND. L. Rnv,
709 (1956); Younger, Community Property, Women and the Law School Curriculum, 48
N.Y.U.L. REv. 211 (1973).
22 Luce, Woman: A Technological Castaway, 1973 BRITANNICA BooK ov TIln YmiAR 24,
27 (emphasis in original).
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Such a situation can be explained on the theory that one of the
parties has an original right to the other's labor without having to pay
for it; although in no other department of life has anyone had such an
ownership of the time and labor of another person since the abolition
of slavery. Clearly, however, that economic relationship between A and
B whereby A has an original ownership of B's labor, with the conse-
quent necessity of providing B's maintenance, is the economic relation-
ship between an owner and his property rather than that between two
free persons. It was the economic relationship between master and slave,
and it is the economic relationship between a person and his domesti-
cated animal. In the English common law the wife was, in economic
relationship to the husband, his property.P
Ioday one occasionally finds a court indicating that sud doctrines are
Lrchaic and ancient concepts, and stating that the wife's legal personality
s no longer merged in that of her husband, 24 but one does not find any
hange in the basic requirement arising from the marital relation that the
vife's total services in the home belong to the husband without compen-
ation.
3. The Support Obligation
The husband has the sole responsibility to support his wife. The
:ommon law placed this duty on the husband because he owned and con-
rolled all her property, all her earnings and her services. \Vhen the
qarried Women's Property Acts permitted a wife the control of her
;eparate property, they did not relieve the husband of his duty to support
ier 25 At that time few women owned property or earned an income
)utside the home, and the services performed in the home continued to
)elong to the husband. The basic cultural bargain continued: husband's
;upport in return for wife's services. 26
2 3 Crozier, Marital Support, 15 BosToN U. L. REv. 28 (1935).
24 Clouston v. Remlinger, supra n. 17; Howell v. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co., 124 N.J.
;uper. 414, 307 A.2d 142 (1973). The Howell opinion severely criticized the unity concept,
ut rather than declaring it invalid, it allowed the wife to recover on an insurance policy in
pite of a defense against the husband by holding that the contract rights were property held
eparately.
25 Although there are no cases allowing an order for support while the parties lived to-
,ether, there are innumerable decisions involving actions for necessaries or criminal non-sup-
,ort enunciating the continuing duty to support. When the parties are separated, direct
)rders for support, for reimbursement, and for payment to third parties who supplied neces-
aries are commonly made. See, for necessaries: Geo. H. Humphrey & Son v. Huff, 3 Ohio
kpp. 111 (1914); Abraham Lincoln Memorial Hospital Corp. v. Gordon, 111 I1l. App. 2d
.79, 249 N.E.2d 311 (1969); Kerner v. Eastern Dispensary and Casualty Hospital, 210 Md.
575, 123 A.2d 333 (1956); cases collected in Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 7 (1958); for reimburse-
nent, Spalding v. Spalding, 361 Ill. 387, 198 N.E. 136 (1935); for direct action: Smith v.
3mith, 86 Ohio App. 479, 92 N.E.2d 418 (1949); Brewer v. Brewer, 259 Ala. 149, 66 So.2d
150 (1953); Genazzi v. Genazzi, 343 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Etheridge v. Webb,
?10 Miss. 729, 50 So.2d 603 (1951); cases collected in Annot., 10 A.LR.2d 466 (1950).
26 Although some courts may consider the amount of money the wife earns or the amount
L974]
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A possible reevaluation of this concept was reflected in statutes such
as that enacted in California and copied in Ohio which stated: "Husband
and wife contract towards each other obligations of mutual respect, fidel-
ity, and support."2  The wife's support obligation under these statutes
was so new that lawyers claimed the meaning of such a strange statute
was beyond the comprehension of lawyers dead or living.28 But the
statute was held to be declaratory of the common law obligation of the
husband to support his wife .2  The courts applied it a significant num-
ber of times, but recognized that the wife's obligation was distinctly sec-
ondary and dependent upon the husband's inability to support himself
and upon her already owning property or earning income which enabled
her to help the husband in his needY0 The cases granting relief either
involved third parties who supplied necessaries or husbands and wives
who were separated."' These interpretations indicate a purpose to pro-
tect the public purse from needy husbands with wives who have assets.
The courts did not reevaluate the basic concepts concerning support of
spouses. Subsequent decisions have reaffirmed that the husband alone
has a duty to support the family, so long as he is able, from property or
earnings. The wife is neither obligated to contribute financially if she
is able nor is she given the recognition that her household services are,
in fact, a form of support of the family.
The predominant feature of the husband's duty to support the family
is that it is an obligation defined and controlled solely by him and is not
enforceable by the wife. As the head of the household, he sets the stan-
dard of living for the family and is only obligated to support the wife
at that level.32 The classic illustration of the inability of the wife to in.
of her assets in determining the amount the husband should pay, there is consensus that the
husband's duty of support is not relieved by her wealth. See, Churchward v. Churchward,
132 Conn. 72, 42 A.2d 659 (1945); Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 114 A.2d 66 (1955);
Ott v. Hentall, 70 N.H. 231, 47 A. 80 (1900); Grishaver v. Grishaver, 225 N.Y.S. 2d 924
(Sup. Ct. 1961); Coleman v. Coleman, 37 Ohio App. 474, 175 N.E. 38 (1930); Heflin v.
Heflin, 177 Va. 385, 14 S.E.2d 317 (1941); Waldrop v. Waldrop, 222 Ala. 625, 134 So. 1
(1931). Cases collected in Annot., 10 A.L.R. 2d 466 at 529 (1950) and Annot., 1 A.L.R,
3rd 208 (1965).
2 7 CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 155, 176, 243 (West 1954); Oino Rnv. CODE § 3103.01 (Page
1972); IDAHO CODE §§ 32-901, 32-915 (1963); MONT. Rv. CODEs ANN. §§ 36.101, 36-
122 (1961); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-07-01 (1971).
28 Hickle v. Hickle, 6 Ohio C.C.R. 490 (1892).
2 Humphrey & Sons v. Huff, 3 Ohio App. 111 (1914),
30Hagert v. I-agert, 22 N.D. 290, 133 N.W. 1035 (1911); Labadie v. Henry, 132 Oklh.
252, 270 P. 57 (1928); Klump v. Klump, 96 Ohio App. 93, 121 N.E.2d 273 (1954).
31See, Hausser v. Ebinger, 161 Ohio St. 192, 118 N.E.2d 522 (1954); Smith v. Snapp,
16 Ohio Op. 2d 304, 175 N.E.2d 333 (1961); In re Milholland, 30 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 563
(1933); Livingston v. Super. Ct. of Los Angeles County, 117 Cal. 633, 49 P. 836 (1897),
32 Coe v. Coe, 313 Mass. 232, 46 N.E.2d 1017 (1943); Pattberg v. Pattberg, 94 I,].
Eq. 715, 120 A. 790 (1923); See, Gimbel Bros., Inc. v. Pinto, 188 Pa, Super 73, 145 A2d
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fluence the level of support given her is McGuire v. McG::ire3s in which
the husband owned assets worth more than $100,000 but forced the fam-
ily to live in a home without bathroom, kitchen sink or adequate furnace
and would not give the wife money for church or charities. The court
would not, however, make an order to assure the wife a better level of
support. In Commonwealth v. George,34 the wife sought an order for a
definite amount of money because she wished control over some of the
finances and because she did not wish to "have to ask for fifty cents."
She was not successful. So long as the law gives the total dominance of
the household to the husband, courts' pronouncements of a right to sup-
port in the wife are trappings without substance3 5
Not only does the husband set the level of his obligation, but if he
ceases to perform it, there is generally no enforcement mechanism given
to the wife. 6 No direct action is permitted by the wife to enforce her
"right to support" if she remains living with the husband, The Supreme
Court of South Carolina in a recent suit involving separated spouses
recognized that removing a remedy for enforcement of support would
relieve the husband of the obligation to support.3g As a practical matter,
that is exactly the situation of the wife who is living with her husband.
So long as she is denied any direct action against the husband, her right
to support is meaningless. She has no right to an allowance, no right
to any fixed amount of money under her personal control, no right to a
claim against the husband's earnings or his property.
865 (1959), where the husband had stated, "To be successful, you have to look successful"
and was held liable for a mink coat!
33 157 Neb. 226, 59 N.W.2d 336 (1953).
4 358 Pa. 118, 56 A.2d 228 (1948).
35 The best she might be able to achieve is a divorce for his cruelty in refusing to allow
them to live reasonably in view of the amount of income he has. See, Miller v. Miller, 320
Mich. 43, 30 N.W.2d. 509 (1948); Jordan Marsh Co. v. Cohen, 242 Mass. 245, 136 N.E.
350 (1922); DeBrauwere v. DeBrauwere, 203 N.Y. 460, 96 N.E. 722 (1911); Grishaver v.
Grishaver, 225 N.Y.S.2d 924 (Sup. Ct. 1961).
-3 One wonders why so little recognition of this fact has been accorded in legal literature.
A contributing factor is that like the tricky weavers of the Emperor's new clothes there were
those who mislead us. The great Roscoe Pound stated that the wife had a direct action to
enforce her right to support, but the cases he cited were ones involving separated husbands
and wives. Pound, Individual Interests in the Domestic Relations, 14 MiCH. L. RV. 177,
195 n. 83 (1916). A second article gave the same misleading impression some years later.
Brown, The Duty of the Husband to Support the Wife, 18 VA. L RE v. 823, 846 (1932).
37 Smith v. Smith, 86 Ohio App. 479, 92 N.E.2d 418 (1949); Chittendro'i v. Chittenden,
22 Ohio C.C.R. 498 (1901); Etheridge v. Webb, 210 Miss. 729, 50 So. 2d 603 (1951);
Elsey v. Elsey, 297 S.W. 978 (Mo. App. 1927); cases collected in Annor., 6 A.LR. 65 (1920)
and Annot., 10 A.L.R 2d 466 (1950); Paulsen, Support Rights and Duties Betueen Hut-
band and Wife, 9 VAND. L REV. 709 (1956).
38Towles v. Towles, 256 S.C. 307, 182 S.W.2d 53 (1971).
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It seems clear that the continuance of the wife's privilege of living
with the husband .. is the substance of what is called her right of sup.
port. ....
So long as the spouses are living together, the wife's right of sup.
port is not a right to any definite thing or to any definite amount even
in proportion to the husband's means. . . To be sure, it is said that he
should support her in accordance with his means, but that is no more
than an ideal, with which he may or may not comply.80
There are a number of explanations for the courts' refusal to recog-
nize a remedy for the wife's right to support while the parties live to.
gether. A very technical explanation at common law was that the wife
had no legal existence. If she could not sue others in her name she like-
wise could not sue her husband. 0 A more likely explanation was the
judicial reflection that the husband's authority in the home was not to be
questioned and the belief that if the wife could live with him surely she
could influence him to provide adequately for her. An acknowledged
purpose was that of keeping the parties together. As late as 1962 a New
York court justified its refusal to grant a support order to a wife who was
still living with her husband, saying, "The court should not encourage a
separation by granting temporary support in which event the wife would
move from the marital residence, if otherwise she might not."41  The
thought was that by ordering money paid to her, the court would render
the wife capable of leaving the husband. This is a clear recognition of
the old notion that keeping the wife barefoot will indeed keep her in the
home. At a time when women could not obtain employment or when
they had minor children to care for, this was surely an effective method of
forcing the wife to continue to live in the household with the husband.
In the New York case, the wife who had been beaten by the husband but
who was without friends or relatives or a job to provide economic aid
was probably compelled to remain with him. Forcing the wife to endure
mistreatment at the hands of the husband until destitution became a more
attractive alternative for her did keep families together-for a while.
Whether it has that effect today is doubtful, and whether it is the best
alternative for the good of society may also be questioned. But the courts
apparently assume its effect and will not be responsible for enabling a
woman to leave her husband.
A second acknowledged aim of the courts in refusing to order support
payments while the parties live together is their reluctance to become
3 Cozier, Marital Support, 15 BOSTON U.L Rv. 28, 33 (1935). See alho, Common.
wealth v. George, 358 Pa. 118, 56 A.2d 228 (1948); McGuire v. McGuire, 157 Ncb, 22 6,
59 NW 2d 336 (1953).
40 Sodowsky v. Sodowsky, 51 Okla. 689, 152 P. 390 (1915).
41 16 App. Div. 2d 409, 411, 228 N.Y.S. 2d 470, 472 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
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involved in handling relatively minor intra-familial grievances. The
courts do not see themselves as budget makers for family units. Holding
that a criminal statute under which the court could order payments ap-
plied only when the parties were separated, the court said:
The statute was never intended to constitute a court a sounding board
for domestic financial disagreements, nor a board of arbitration to de-
termine the extent to which a husband is required to recognize the bud-
get suggested by the wife or her demands for control over the purse
strings.42
One suspects that the courts fear a burdensome caseload, or perhaps a
type of caseload which judges are not well equipped to handle. The
courts seem to be reasoning that they will have to draw the line some-
where as to what grievances they will hear, and they are drawing the line
at the family level45 This reasoning is unsound in light of the courts'
insistence that marriage and the family are the foundation of society and
civilization. How ironic it is that the courts' refusal to entertain these
requests indirectly encourages a separation of the parties and a complete
breakdown of the family unit. Only in separation does the right to sup-
port find legal substance. Until then the right to support is no more than
the wife's right to live with the husband and render to him sufficient
household and sexual services to obtain her support.
Attempts to achieve enforceable rights by private agreements have
been unsuccessful. Husbands and wives, aware of the failure of the law
to accord the wife specific or enforceable rights to support, have sought
to do so by private agreement. They have been unsuccessful in these
attempts. The common law duty of support is imposed by operation of
law as an incident of the marital relationship, rather than as a legal obli-
gation sounding in contract. The courts uniformly adopt the view that
the legally imposed incidents of marriage cannot be modified. As the
court in Maynard v. Hill held:
The consent of the parties is of course essential to its existence, but
when the contract to marry is executed by marriage, a relation between
the parties is cleated which they cannot change. Other contracts may
be modified, restricted, or enlarged, or entirely released upon the consent
of the parties. Not so with marriage. The relation once formed, the
law steps in and hold the parties to various obligations and liabilities.
4 2 Commonwealth v. George, 358 Pa. 118, 121, 56 A.2d 228, 231 (1948).
43 There is also an element of wishful thinking in some opinions. Viewing the marriage
relation as unitary was more important than allowing reimbursement to a wife who may have
intended to "loan" her husband money during the marriage in Rey v. Rey, 279 So. 2d 360
(Fla. Ct. App. 1973). The court said it was degrading to the institution of marriage to see
dissolution degenerate into a battle between accountants and that allowing a judgment for
the money would be "totally incompatible to the unity concept of marriage."
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It is an institution, in the maintenance of which in its purity the public
is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the family and society,
without which thiere would be neither civilization nor progress. 44
A few states, such as Ohio, freeze this judicially announced concept in
statutes: "Husband and wife cannot, by any contract with each other,
alter their legal relations, except that they may agree to an immediate
separation and make provisions for the support of either of them and
their children during the separation."45
Consequently, a private contract between the parties to alter the hus-
band's support obligation is invalid, on the theory that the duty of sup-
port is so important to the preservation and stability of the marital rela-
tionship that variation is against public policy and therefore void.4 A
fortiori, a wife's promise to provide support for the family is unenforce-
able,47 as is her promise to make periodic payments to her husband."
Since nothing in the law now obligates a wage earning or propertied wife
to contribute to the support of the family, it is impossible for spouses
who desire an enforceable support obligation in the wife as well as the
husband to achieve it.
The obligations are unalterable not merely as a matter of public pol-
icy. Courts have held that the husband's promise of support even at a
fixed level is not adequate consideration for a contract with his wife, as
he is promising no more than he is already obligated by law to do.40 The
same reasoning has been used to discount the wife's promise to render ser-
vices in the home in return for a fixed compensation or amount of sup-
port."°
The inability of husband and wife to alter their relationships by con-
tract renders it impossible for a wife to have a legal guarantee of a fixed
44 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 211 (1888).
45 OHIO REV. CODE § 3103.06 (Page 1972).
46 Towles v. Towles, 256 S.C. 307, 182 S.E.2d 53 (1971); Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y.
337, 18 N.E.2d 521 (1939); Williams v. Williams, 29 Ariz. 538, 243 P. 402 (1926);
VanKoten v. VanKoten, 323 111. 323, 154 N.E. 146 (1926); French v. McAnarney, 290
Mass. 544, 195 N.E. 714 (1935); In re Simonson, 165 Wis. 590, 160 N.W. 1040 (1917).
47 Corcoran v. Corcoran, 119 Ind. 138, 21 N.E. 469 (1889).
48 Brewer v. Brewer, 79 Neb. 726, 113 N.W. 161 (1907); Poor v. Poor, 8 N.H. 307
(1836).
49 See, In re Ryan's Estate, 134 Wis. 431, 114 N.W. 820 (1908); Garlock v. Garlock,
279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E.2d 251 (1939).
5o Attempts to relinquish the husband's right to the wife'.s services so that she could then
contract with him for them have generally been doomed to failure. The reasoning Is that
even though the Married Women's Property Acts enabled the wife to contract freely with her
husband, they did not emancipate her from the duty of rendering services to him without
compensation; thus her promise to perform them could not constitute consideration. Ritchie
v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 35 S.E.2d 414 (1945); Warren, Husband': Right to Services, tpra
n. 7; But see, O'Day v. Meadows, 194 Mo. 588, 92 S.W. 637 (1906).
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level of support within the ongoing marriage. The Garlock decision,
which held invalid a contract between unseparated spouses for a fixed
level of support, mentioned that such an agreement would interfere with
a desired flexibility in family economic affairs. 51 Since a wife has no
remedy available to enforce support payments, "desired flexibility" means
that it is desirable that the husband have the arbitrary power to decide
how he will support the family.
In only one area will courts uphold a contract between parties living
together which provides for a fixed level of support: that is in the case
of a "reunion" agreement. In Adams v. Adams,"2 the parties were hav-
ing marital problems. The wife agreed to take the husband back if he
would make a weekly cash payment. The court enforced the contract
which required a $100 weekly payment to the wife as a reunion agree-
ment. 3 Considering the lack of remedies for enforcement of support
obligations in an ongoing marriage, it appears that the only way a mar-
ried woman can insure adequate support and compensation for her ser-
vices in the home is by separating from her husband and insisting on a
contract guaranteeing a fixed level of support as a prerequisite to resump-
tion of cohabitation. This solution is tragic. Courts refuse to enforce
support obligations when the parties are living together because of a fear
of breaking up the matrimonial home. By this refusal, purportedly based
on strengthening the family unit, courts indirectly create reasons for ter-
minating the marriage.
C. Rights of Others Relating to Spouses' Support Obligations
There are currently four legal avenues through which third parties
or the state may seek enforcement of support obligations. These include
(1) an action for necessaries, (2) family expense statutes, (3) poor laws,
and (4) criminal non-support laws. The first of these, an action for
necessaries, is a right of action belonging to a creditor to whom the wife
has pledged her husband's credit. The wife living with her husband is
empowered by the common law to pledge his credit for the purchase of
necessaries for herself and the family. This has been described as the
remedy afforded to her if the husband fails in his obligation of support.54
5 1 Garlock v. Garlock, 279 N.Y. 337, 18 N.E. 2d 251 (1939).
5217 N.J. Misc. 234, 8 A.2d 214 (1939).
53 But even in reunion contracts great care must be exerdsed to make them valid. In
Towles v. Towles, 256 S.C. 307, 182 S.E.2d 53 (1971), the court held such an agreement
invalid because the wife promised not to bring any action against the husband for support.
The court held that without a remedy there was no right to support and, therefore, the con-
tract was void as removing the husband's obligation to support See also, Terkelsen v. Peter-
son, 216 Mass. 531, 104 N.E. 351 (1914).
54 Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 14 A.2d 66 (1955).
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The right is actually not the right of the wife, but a right of action be-
longing to the supplier which he may assert against the husband. Noth-
ing in the wife's "right to support" places any obligation on a supplier
to provide necessaries for her. Only if the wife can persuade the mer.
chant to sell to her on the husband's credit can she benefit. Court deci-
sions reveal that even in the days of the friendly corner grocer a wife
found it difficult to obtain her needs through this device. The Iowa su-
preme court pointed out:
The wife may find it' difficult, if not impossible, to obtain a continuous
support in this way, since such dealers and professional men would be
unwilling to supply their articles or services if thus compelled to resort
to litigation in order to secure their pay. Here then is a plain legal duty
of the husband for the violation of which no adequate remedy .. .can
be had .... 5
In addition to a merchant's general reluctance to pursue an uncon-
senting debtor, the burden of proving his cause of action is so onerous
that it will discourage him from supplying the wife with her needs unless
the husband has actually agreed to payY0 First, he must prove that the
items supplied were indeed necessaries: items needed and appropriate to
the standard of living which the husband had established for the family."
Second, the merchant must establish that the husband was not already
supplying the needs of the wife."' A merchant will be hard-pressed to
determine whether a specific item is "necessary" since the definition of
that term varies with the family situation. In Bloomingdale Bros. Inc. v.
Benjamin,59 the court held that whale meat and caviar were "necessaries"
because, "in the gilded world wherein the Benjamins moved, whale meat
and caviar may very well have been regarded as plain but honorable."
At its best the action for necessaries might benefit the Mrs. Benjamins of
the world. A merchant would take the risk of collecting from the
wealthy man, but there is no incentive for him to supply the middle or
low economic classes in this fashion.
The merchant also runs a risk that the wife has wrongfully left the
husband, for only wives who are living with their husbands or who have
separated with good cause have the power to pledge their husband's
55 Graves v. Graves, 36 Iowa 310, 14 Am. Rep. 525 (1873) quoted in Avery v, Avery,
17 N.W.2d 820, 821 (Iowa 1945).
56 See cases collected in Annot., 60 A.L.R. 207 (1958).
57Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 114 A.2d 66 (1955); Labadie v. Henry, 132 Okla. 252,
270 P. 57 (1928); Hinton Dept. Co. v. Lilly, 105 W. Va. 126, 141 S.E. 629 (1928);
Woodward & Perkins v. Bonner, 43 Vt. 330 (1870).
5 8 Saks & Co. v. Bennett, 12 N.J. Super. 316, 79 A.2d 479 (1951); James McCreery &
Co. v. Martin, 84 N.J. L. 626, 87 A. 433 (1913); Keller v. Phillips, 39 N.Y. 353 (1868).
59 200 Misc. 1108, 1110, 112 N.Y.S.2d 33, 35 (N.Y. City Ct. 1955).
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credit.60 Overall it is obvious that pledging the husband's credit for
necessaries is a less than satisfactory means of enforcing a supposed right
to be supported.
The second method of enforcing support obligations by third party
action is through Family Expense Statutes which were passed in many ju-
risdictions in conjunction with the Married Women's Property Acts.0'
Their purpose may have been to soothe creditors who feared loss of the
wife's property as an asset for payment of family debts when the hus-
band no longer had control of her property. For the first time the wife's
property under these statutes is directly subject to the obligation for fam-
ily support.
The Missouri statute states that annual products of the wife's separate
real estate "may be attached or levied upon for any debt or liability of
her husband, created for necessaries for the wife and family. . . .$ A
similar statute subjects the wife's personal property to such execution."
This has been held to be a legislative continuation of the common law
liability of the wife's property for the husband's debts.6 4  Although Mis-
souri courts hold that no direct personal obligation for support of the
family is created against the wife,65 the statute clearly continues the com-
mon law practice of allowing creditors to take the wife's property prior
to or in lieu of the husband's to satisfy debts for necessaries.60
In states such as Iowa and Illinois the family expense statute is worded
more broadly!
The expenses of the family and of the education of the children shall
be chargeable upon the property of both husband and wife, or of either
of them, in favor of creditors therefore, and in relation thereto they may
be sued jointly or separately.' 7
Both of these states' courts have held that the statute creates not only a
60 Abraham Lincoln Memorial Hosp. Corp. v. Gordon, 111 111. App. 2d 179, 249 N.2d
311 (1969); Kerner v. Eastern Dispens. & Casualty Hosp., 210 Md. 375, 123 A.2d 333
(1956); Cowell v. Phillips, 17 ILL 188, 20 A. 933 (1890).
61111 VERNIER, AMERiCAN FAMILY LAWS § 160 (1935).
0 2 REv. STAT. Mo. § 451.260 (1952); See also Megraw v. Woods, 93 Mo. App. 647,
67 S.W. 709 (1902); Ault v. Fller, 38 Mo. App. 598 (1890).
6 3 REv. STAT. MO. § 451.250, (1952); Dougherty v. McClelland, 192 Mo. App. 498,
182 S.W. 766, (1916); Harned v. Shores, 75 Mo. App. 500 (1898).
64D. M. Osborne & Co. v. Graham, 46 Mo. App. 28 (1891); Gabriel v. Mullen, 111 Mo.
119, 19 S.W. 1099 (1892).
65 Towles v. Owsley, 44 Mo. App. 436 (1891); Harred v. Shores, 75 Mo. App. 500
(1898).
66 A due process challenge to this statute was ineffective in Gabriel v. Mullen, 111 Mo.
119, 19 S.W. 1099 (1892). Quaere: -what decision today?
6D7 ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, 15 (Smith Hurd 1959).
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charge against the wife's property but also personal liability."' The Illi-
nois courts have also held that "family expenses" are not so broad as
those for necessaries. Family expenses must be items which benefit or
mutually affect the members of the family generally, whereas necessaries
may be personal and individual items."' This type of family expense
statute does nothing to create direct personal rights for support in either
spouse, but it represents a weak move toward equality of responsibility
for family support at least on the part of spouses who have property.70
Another type of statute, also inaugurated at the time of the Married
Women's Property Acts, retains the concept that the husband's property
and labor are primarily responsible for support, but obligates the wife to
provide support when the husband is unable to do so."' These statutes
create a direct support obligation upon (he wife for which she is not en-
titled to obtain reimbursement from the husband.72 But this obligation
is secondary in the sense that it does not exist until the husband is dis-
abled. However, like the common law right of support no direct action
is created by these statutes for parties living together. The right is mere-
ly that of creditors.
Poor laws or family responsibility statutes are a third means of en-
forcing support and are presently in force in thirty-three states. These
laws impose an obligation upon certain persons to support relatives.13
In the tradition of the Elizabethan poor laws, these laws function as wel-
fare or private assistance measures and serve to shift financial burdens
which would otherwise threaten or tap the public purse, Consequently,
such remedies as are provided are designed to secure minimum support
68 Frost v. Parker, 65 Iowa 178, 21 N.W. 507 (1884); Hayden v. Rogers, 22 I11. App,
557 (1887); Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Hyde, 39 Ill.2d 433, 235 NE.2d 643 (1968). See
cases collected in Annot., 15 A.L.R. 781 (1921) for other states and other variations in in.
terpretation.
09 Hyman v. Harding, 162 Ill. 357, 44 N.E. 754 (1896).
70 It has been stated that the husband's primary obligation of support continues so that
the wife may obtain reimbursement from him for her money or property involuntarily ex-
pended for support, H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMEsTIc RELATIONs, 187, (1968), but this does
not seem to be true when the parties remain living together. See Spalding v. Spalding, 361
I1. 387, 198 N.E. 136 (1935); Courtright v. Courtright, 53 Iowa 57, 4 N.W. 824 (1880);
41 AM. JuR. 2d Husband & Wife § 335 (1968).
7 1 OHIo REv. CODE § 3103.03 (Page 1972); CAL. Civ. CODE § 5132 (West 1970).
72 Hausser v. Ebinger, 16 Ohio St. 2d 192, 118 N.E. 2d 522 (1954). But see Sodowsky
v. Sodowsky, 51 Okla. 689, 152 P. 390 (1915), where the court stated a wife who was not
being supported could extend credit to the husband and collect from him just as a third
party could under the portion of the statute authorizing actions by those who supply necessaries,
73 Analyses of these laws can be found in Mandelker, Family Responsibility Under the
American Poor Laws, 54 MIcH. L REv. 497, 607 (1956) [hereinafter cited as Mandelker]
and in Tully, Family Responsibility Laws: An Unwise and Unconstitutonal Impoiton, 5
FAM. LAW Q. 32 (1971).
[Vol, 35
PARTNERSHIP MARRIAGE
necessary for sustenance and health. 4 Even though the statute may state
that one spouse is obligated to support the other, these statutes are not
employed to enforce the common law duty of support7 5 Because the
poor laws serve only a welfare purpose, Mandelker suggested that those
entitled to common law support, wives and children, should be removed
from the poor laws. If necessary, he suggested a direct action by chil-
dren against their parents for suitable support should be created.1 He
did not suggest creating a direct action between spouses. This is prob-
ably because he mistakenly believed that it already existed.-I
The poor laws are not a method of enforcing the common law duty
of support. Even though public officials or even one spouse might ob-
tain money from the other under the family responsibility statutes, it
would be a minimal amount. The statutes serve the very poor; they are
not a codification or additional remedy available for enforcement of the
wife's common law right of support.
Another statutory attempt to enforce support is found in the criminal
non-support laws; nearly all states make it a criminal offense for a hus-
band to fail to support his wife."' Two substantive limitations on this
criminal offense in most jurisdictions demonstrate that these statutes do
not give a remedy for enforcing the common law duty of support. First,
most statutes require both desertion or abandonment and non-support
'so that by their terms they are not applicable to the woman still living
with her husband.79 The husband may not desert his wife and starve her,
but he may stay at home and starve her. This reflects the traditional hes-
itancy to accord legal sanctions for matters within the ongoing family.
Second, in most states the statutes provide that the wife must be "necessi-
tous" or destitute, in the sense of not being supplied with the bare essen-
tials of life by anyone, in order to sustain conviction. 0  The Missouri
courts' attitude was extreme. In State v. Ball the court said: "In order for
74 Mandelker found that 2/3 of the statutes create a remedy only in a public official, but
that many courts have also permitted the needy individual to obtain an order for payment.
Mandelker at 608.
75Mandelker at 503.
70Mandelker at 508.
77 He cited Brown's misleading article, supra note 36, in stating, "Most courts now allow
the wife to sue the husband directly for support," Mandelker at 498-99 n. 2.
78 Ohio was a rarity with no crime unless the wife was pregnant, OHIO REV. CODE §
3113.01, 3113.99 (Page 1972), until January 1, 1974, when H.B. 511 became effective.
In modernizing the entire criminal code it brought into being OHIO REV. CODE § 2919.21
which makes it a misdemeanor for any person having a duty of support to fail to provide ade-
quate support.
7 9 See discussions and cases cited in H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS 202
(1968) and Jones, The Problem of Family Support: Criminal Sanctions for the Enforcement
of Support, 38 N.C.L. Rev. 1 (1959).
80See cases collected in Annot, 36 A.L.R. 866 (1925).
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the state to make a case... [in prosecution for wife and child abandon-
menti it must appear that the wife or the child or children are actually
in need of necessary food, clothing, and lodging."'" A husband was not
guilty when the wife had necessary food, clothing, and lodging through
her own efforts," or through generosity of relatives.88 In jurisdictions
where these interpretations persist, the purpose of the criminal law is ob-
viously to protect the public from support of deserted wives and nothing
more.
Recent experience in Missouri reflects what is currently the more com-
mon practice: to use criminal penalties without requiring that the wife
and children be on welfare or actually destitute. The Missouri law was
amended in 1947 to omit the requirement of abandonment of wife and
to change the requirement of destitution to "neglect" or refusal "to
provide adequate support."8' However, the statutory changes have not
been the equivalent of enforcing the common law duty of support, The
analogous situation in State v. Davis85 is illustrative. An order for child
support had been given in connection with granting a divorce. When a
criminal prosecution for non-support was brought, it was argued that the
defendant-father would be guilty only if he had the capacity to pay the
amount ordered in the civil action. The Missouri supreme court held
that the criminal action did not serve as enforcement of amounts ordered
for child support in a divorce action. It defined "adequate support" as
that "reasonably suitable to the condition in life and commensurate with
the defendant's ability," '' but held that the State did not have to prove
that defendant had the capacity to provide as much as the support called
for by the divorce decree. The aim of the statute seems to be to provide
criminal penalties to assure somewhat better support of dependents but
not to function as a state controlled remedy for the level of support that
the marital relation requires. The possibility of greater obligations aris-
ing from the marriage contract remains.
In a few states the criminal statutes require neither desertion or neces.
sitous circumstances. Connecticut's criminal non-support statute states:
81 State v. Ball, 157 S.W.2d 262 (Mo. Ct. App. 1942).
82State v. Higbee, 110 S.W.2d 789 (Mo. Ct. App. 1937).
83 State v. Thornton, 233 Mo. 298, 134 S.W. 519, 32 L.R.A. (n.s.) 841 (1911).
84 Mo. Laws 1947, vol. 1, p. 259. This amendment's specification in regard to support
of children that it was immaterial whether or not they suffered actual want or destitution was
applied to wife support in State v. Roseberry, 283 S.W.2d 652 (Mo. Ct. App. 1955) citing
Laws 1953, p. 424. However, the section was broken into two sections by Laws 1965, p. 669,
and that reference to wife was dropped, apparently inadvertently. The pertinent law is now
REv. STAT. Mo. § 559.353 (Supp. 1974).
85 State v. Davis, 469 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1971).
80 Id. at 4.
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(a) [a]ny person who neglects or refuses to furnish reasonably necessary
support to his wife, child under the age of eighteen or parent under the
age of sixty-five shall be deemed guilty of non-support and shall be im-
prisoned not more than one year .... Such court may suspend the ex-
ecution of any jail sentence imposed, upon any terms or conditions that
it deems just .... [alnd... may order that the person convicted shall
pay through the family relations division of the circuit court, such sup-
port, in such amount as the court may find commensurate with the neces-
sities of the case and the ability of such person, for such period as the
court shall -determine.87
[ere a remedy seems to be available for enforcement of the husband's
)mmon law duty of support, but a closer look, through the perspective
f case law interpretation, shows that the non-support statute provides
ich a remedy in only limited situations. The statute goes on to provide
iat "A written agreement to support.., made with the family relations
ivision of the circuit court by the liable relative and filed with said court,
.all have the same force and effect as an order of support by the circuit
turt .. .."I" The apparent purpose of the procedure is to achieve an out-
-court agreement with the man under which he will make payments to
ie family relations division to be handed over to his family or to reim-
arse the welfare department.* A Connecticut decision is sometimes
ted as authority for the proposition that the order of support will be
rrived at just as in a civil non-support suitL0 The language of State v.
foran sounds promising:
To support a wife, in the commonly accepted meaning of the phrase,
means more [sic] to supply her with barely enough to keep her from
being a pauper or an object of charity, or from being in danger of fall-
ing into that condition. To support a wife is to furnish her with such
necessaries as the law deems essential to her health and comfort, includ-
ing suitable clothing, lodgings, food, and medical attendance. What
they are in kind and amount is to be determined in each case by the
means, ability, social position, and circumstances both of the particular
husband and of his wife.91
[owever, there are no facts outlined in the case report to indicate that
claim for support above the subsistence level was being sought. In
ict, the question before the court was'whether or not the trial court erred
i overruling a demurrer by the defendant on the grounds that the infor-
8 7 CoNN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 53-304(a) (1974-1975 Supp.).
88M.
89 Sadow, The Poor Have Children 20-24 (unpublished senior studies paper from Yale
tw School) (1966).
90 H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMEsTIc RELATIONS 202 (1968). See also Annot, 36 A.LR.'
i6 (1925).
9199 Conn. 115, 120, 121 A. 277, 279 (1923).
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mation did not state facts sufficient to show that the accused had violated
a statute of the state, in that the information did not allege that "either
his wife or his child is or may become a public charge by reason of his
neglect or refusal to support them. ' - The court's language is understand-
able in light of the defendant's contention. The court would not want
to require a showing such as that required in Missouri that a man's wife
or child was actually destitute as a prerequisite to invoking the statute.
The court would want to extend the remedy to wives and mothers who
were not likely to become a public charge because of outside support
from relatives, but who were receiving no support from their husbands.
A later pertinent case is State v. Boyd,8 quoting State v. Moran as
precedent for its determination that the purpose of Connecticut's criminal
non-support statute is not only to protect the public purse, but also to
provide directly for unsupported wives and children. But again the facts
of the case do not call for arriving at the amount as in a civil action. The
suit was brought at the instance of the state welfare department which
was providing support for the defendant's minor son through its aid-to-
dependent-children program. The court held that being on welfare is
not a precondition for invoking the remedy and that the purpose of the
statute was to "provide directly" for wives and children. This allows a
wife or child who is not being provided for to seek the assistance of the
family relations department as a "collection agency" without having to
go through the humiliation of applying for welfare as a condition prece-
dent to invoking a criminal action for support. The uncertain effect of
these two decisions coupled with the actual practice in Connecticut of
utilizing the criminal action only on behalf of persons who have been
deserted and who have little or no financial help"4 suggests that even
there the common law duty of support is not enforced by the state.
The Maryland decision in Ewell v. State"5 quoted the Moran case and
92Id. at 116, 121 A. at 278.
93 State v. Boyd, 4 Conn. Cir. 544, 236 A.2d 476 (1967).
94 Satlow, rupra note 89 at 20-25, described the following situation: In over half the
cases brought to court, the family is on welfare. In these cases the criminal non.support pro.
ceeding functions as a means for reimbursing the public purse. The majority of the remaining
cases are initiated by wives who complain of lack of support. And the rest of the cases, a
very small proportion, are born out of situations where a couple comes to the family relations
department for counselling or is referred to the department by the circuit court after being
arrested for breach of the peace. It is this small margin of cases that are likely to involve
married couples living together. But the family relations division's normal procedure Is to
threaten arrest for non-support if the husband refuses to sign a s pport agreement worked
out by the division. However, if the man is living with his wife, tb threat of arrest is usually
not invoked. A female member of the family relations division gave this justification for
the administrative practice, "I don't know why a man should have terms that he has to pay
in here if they're living together."
05Ewell v. State, 207 Md. 288, 114 A.2d 66 (1955).
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described the criminal law as enforcing the husband's civil duty of sup-
port. However, the issue in Ewell was simply whether there could be
criminal responsibility for total failure to support if the wife had in-
dependent funds. The court did not decide on the level of the support
required by the common law as contrasted with that under the criminal
law, but it held that the criminal law was the same as the civil in regard
to the immateriality of the wife's assets.
On balance,- criminal non-support laws, like the family responsibility
statutes, serve primarily a public welfare value. Neither in the wording
of the statutes nor in the case law or day-to-day practice of prosecuting
attorneys is there any indication that these laws serve to give substance
to the common law duty of support arising from the marriage contract.
II. THE LAW OF SUPPORT: CONCLUSIONS
The first conclusion to be drawn from this study of the law of spousal
support is that the law is ineffective. While husband and wife live to-
gether, the husband's common law duty of support does not guarantee
the full-time housewife or the family any economic security. A married
woman does not have equal rights to the family income despite the fact
that she may devote seventy or more hours a week to performance of
household services necessary or conducive to the family welfare. In fact,
she has no enforceable right to any money, compensation, or allowance.
Her "right to support" is not the right to be maintained at a level com-
mensurate with either her efforts or the amount of the husband's earn-
ings or assets. She is not legally entitled to any remuneration for her
household services and consequently, she is given no legally enforceable
claim on the husband's earnings or on the property he amasses.
At first glance, one does not appreciate the full import of this lack
of remedy. A closer look shows that while a woman chooses to live with
her husband she has no control over her own ability to remain in the
home. If she desires to continue living with the man who gambles or
drinks up most of his paycheck on Friday night, she must be content with
what he decides to give her, because she can do nothing to compel more
adequate support from him. If she requires more funds to live ade-
quately, she must get a job or leave her husband. Whether she gets
much or little is for the husband to decide. Having no enforceable right
of support, a married woman has no way to build a nest egg for retire-
ment, and no social security or retirement system to provide for her old
age except through the husband's efforts.
The courts' failure to face the emptiness of this right to support not
only has prevented us from considering whether a better system could be
1974]
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adopted, but has done serious harm. The Citizen's Advisory Council on
the Status of Women reports that
The prevalance of mistaken ideas about a husband's responsibility for
support of wife and children, which have been reinforced by opponents
of the equal rights amendment, are [sic] a great disservice to the nation,
particularly to its women and young girls. Many young women, relying
on the belief that marriage means financial security, do not prepare
themselves vocationally. Parents and counselors act on this false as-
sumption in advising girls about their future. 96
The common law concepts of support are also ineffective in requiring
from the wife any financial contribution to the family. Forty-five per.
cent of wives, living with their husbands, earn wages outside the home.
But the only obligation to contribute to the family which the law places
upon them, even in theory, is the duty to render household services.
Neither the husband nor the family, has any right to a share of the wife's
outside earnings or to a financial contribution from the nearly one-half
of the wives who work outside the home. Furthermore, the law today
forbids married couples from contracting with each other to create equal
rights and duties of support between themselves. Thus, the effectiveness
of the common law duty of support fails on all counts: it provides no
real protection to a family with a full-time homemaker and it requires no
monetary contribution to the family from a wage earning wife.
In addition to being ineffective, support laws are inequitable. In view
of the rapidly changing role of women in the family and society, the fact
that support rights and obligations between husband and wife have re-
mained unchanged for over 200 years is shocking. Many current writers
have expressed surprise at the tenacity of the legal doctrine of support.
Homer Clark, in his text The Law of Domestic Relations stated, "It is
somewhat surprising that the principles have not been affected by the
Married Women's Property Acts and the changed economic position of
women.""7  Leo Kanowitz in Women and the Law restated the point
saying, "In the light of fundamental changes in the husband-wife rela.
tionship worked by the Married Women's Acts and other emancipatory
legislation, the legal rules about support often appear to have been left
behind by social developments." '
For many women the most significant inequity of these common law
concepts preserving the traditional roles of husband and wife is that they
96 U. S. DEP'T OF LABOR, CITIZENS ADVISORY COUNCIL ON THE STATUS OV WOMEN,
THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT AND ALIMONY AND CHILD SUPPORT LAWS 7 (1972).
For an example of reinforcement of these mistaken ideas, see The Right to be A WVonman, 6
The Phyllis Schlafly Report 4 (November 1972).
97 H. CLARK, LAWS OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS, 182 (1968).
9SL. KANOWITZ, WOMEN AND THE LAW 70 (1969).
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perpetuate an inequality of legal status that is inappropriate for our so-
ciety. The first dimension of that inequality is that the law continues to
treat the husband as head of the household with full authority to direct
the family's affairs. It does so on the strength of an unfounded belief that
unity and preservation of the family require a single head with power
and control. These outmoded legal attitudes have been criticized by the
American Home Economics Association because they penalize both men
and women and fail to foster homes and families in which all members
can function as effective individuals." The law does not accurately re-
flect what is occurring within successful marriages at the present time.
The few empirical studies that have been done indicate that most suc-
cessful marriages are partnerships with the husbands and wives sharing
equally in decision making, rather than an autocracy with husband ruling
as head. 1' ° The family is a social unit that requires joint effort and de-
cision-making of two persons devoted to its maintenance. The law should
not foster and perpetuate values contrary to that purpose. It is particu-
larly inappropriate when those values continue a subservient status for
one of the marital partners. The refusal to give the wife a legal vote in
that joint venture brands her as unequal and second class in the venture.
The second inequity in legal status arises from the fact that on mar-
riage a woman loses the right to her own labors in the home.10' The
economic relationship of husband and wife, in which the husband has
original ownership of the wife's labors with the reciprocal duty of pro-
viding support, has been described as "the relationship between owner
and property."' 0  That the law should regard one human being as the
chattel of another runs counter to the most fundamental values of free-
dom cherished in our country.
A third inequity is the failure of the law to recognize that the wife's
prodigious contributions to the household are valuable to society. The
refusal to value these services in economic terms treats her as a socially
99 Statement by Dr. Marjorie East, President, American Home Economics Association,
March 19, 1974.
100JAcOBS &-ANGELL, A RESEARCH IN FAMILY LAw 469 (1930). Max Rheinstein
points out that it
is the essence of a good marriage that crises arise and that they are overcome
through the common effort of both parties to understand, to be patient, to endure,
to stick together, and thus to grow to ever fuller understanding, to become one not
only in flesh but in mind and spirit.
M. RHEINSTEIN, MARRIAGE STABILrTY, DIVORCE AND THE LAw 427-443 (1972).
101 John Stuart Mill declared, "Marriage is the only actual bondage known to our law.
There remain no legal slaves, except the mistress of every house." J. S. Mill, The Subjection
of-Women, in ON LIBERTY AND OTHER ESSAYS 195 (E. Neff ed. 1926). This work is
quoted extensively in Johnston, Jr., Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, the Law
School Curriculum, and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U.L REV. 1035 (1972).
102 CrozierXMarital Support, 15 BOSTON U. L. REV. 28, 34 (1935).
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non-productive person. The supposed "right" to be supported by the
husband without regard to the quality or quantity of her contribution to
the family categorizes her as a parasite. At a time when society is par-
ticularly attuned to the dignity and worth of each individual, it is unjust
for the law to ignore the "valuable contribution that a wife or homemaker
renders to the family.
A fourth inequity is the needless limitation upon the freedom of hus.
band and wife which results from the common law prohibition against
their defining by contract the legal incidents of the marriage relationship.
The invalidity of contracts between husband and wife relating to their
duties of support and performance of household services forces them into
a status with legal connotations that are not necessary or conducive to the
stability of the family. Those connotations are so demeaning to some
young people that they prefer to live together without entering the legal
status of marriage. Others simply wish to delineate for themselves the
parameters of their marital relationship. A study center at Case Western
Reserve University is now collecting examples of privately drawn mar.
riage contracts.1 3 Although some of these agreements may be so far
afield from society's fundamental concepts of marriage that they should
not be given legal validity, one cannot justify invalidating all contractual
bases for the duties of financial support and performance of household
services. This is especially true when contract is the only means by which
either party could obtain enforceable rights. To limit an individual's
capacity to order his private affairs "by contract in the absence of demon-
strated social advantage seems inherently unjust.
A fifth inequity arising from the application of common law concepts
to the marriage relationship is the failure of the law to place any obliga.
tion upon the wife who earns money to contribute financially to the fam-
ily. To require only the husband to make monetary contributions when
both partners are earning wages is unrealistic. This traditional approach
ignores the changing societal role that has been forced upon women by
the technological revolution. In a revealing article entitled "Woman:
A Technological Castaway," Clare Booth Luce explains that the tasks
once performed in the home by women are no longer done there. Wom-
an's traditional housewife and child-rearing roles are in a state of occu-
pational decline:
Today all the weaving, almost all the preparation and production of
food, and the manufacture of all household equipment and utensils are
"man's work." Man is now the weaver, baker, butcher, candlestick
maker, pot-and-pan manufacturer of society. There is almost no produc-
103 HARPERS, May, 1974 at 102.
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tive domestic task, once traditional and "natural' to woman, that man
has not taken over.' o0
As a result, women have been moving into the employment force in order
to make the same economic contributions to their families that they once
made through household production and household services. Nearly forty
percent of the workforce in the United States is female.105  Forty-one
percent of the married women living with their husbands were employed
in 1970,106 up from only sixteen percent in 1940.0? In Missouri over fifty
percent of the mothers of school age children have outside employment
and thirty-four percent of mothers with preschool age children also
work. 0 8  "Since the period immediately preceding World War II, the
number of women workers has more than doubled, but the number of
working mothers has increased eightfold."10D It is simply not efficient for
a household which, needs an economic addition to the husband's earnings
to obtain it through the wife's services in making soap and medicines.
The technological revolution has forced both parents into the market-
place.
As long ago as 1943 Sayre recognized that when both parties were
earning money and performing services in the home a more realistic re-
flection of family life would be a legal requirement that each contribute
according to his or her individual ability to the marriage venture rather
than a rigid requirement of services from the wife and support from
the husband."0  The statistics tell us emphatically that wives in large
numbers are expending a great deal of time which was once devoted to
household services to the earning of wages. There seems no justification
for allowing one member of an institution so important to our society as
104 1973 BRITANNIcA BOOK OF THE YEAR 24, 27 (1973).
105WOMEN'S BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, WOMEN WORKERS TODAY 1 (1970).
101 US. DEP'T. OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACrs OF THE UNITED STATES 213
(1971).
1o7 J. KREPS, Sex in the Marketplace: American lomen at Work, 18 JOHNS HOPKINS
POLICY STUDIES IN EMPLOYMENT & WELFARE NO. 11 (1971).
108 REPORT OF THE MISSOURI COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (Dec. 1973).
109 WOMEN'S BUREAU, U. S. DEPT. OF LABOR, WYho are the WVorking Mothers? (1972).
110 Sayre, A Reconsideration of Husband's Duty to Support and WVife's Duty to Render
Services, 29 VA. L. REv. 857, 864 (1943).
No wife worthy of the name wants to be supported by anybody ... Isn't it fair to
say that the wife does not want to be supported by anyone as a matter of personal
duty or condescension? . . . We may reasonably assume that she can support her-
self quite well if she didn't undertake this marriage venture. What she is concerned
about is her husband's share of this undertaking and her share of it, in which they
both serve the marriage itself with equal dignity though with very different func-
dons. It is good sense and strictly in keeping with the facts to talk about husband
and wife contributing to the family, that is, their joint venture in marriage whether
or not it may include children... Viewed sociologically therefore, it is a question
of what the law should call a fair contribution of each party to that joint venture.
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marriage to retain all wealth or earnings for her own ends. A just law
would impose an obligation upon both spou,;es to share the profits of
their labor with the family unit.
These antiquated but persistent concepts of wife as non-productive
property, fulfilling only the role of wife and mother in the home, do
more than perpetuate unjust legal relationships. The final inequity is
that they affect and help mold the self-image and self-concept that women
and men have of themselves in society. Paulsen suggested that these
legal concepts gave a reality to a cherished myth. He described our cher-
ished ideal thus: "In the best of worlds Alice does not leave after break-
fast for a job which may bring more money into the household than her
husband's earnings. It is best if she is the protected homemaker and he
the protecting provider." '' Cherished values from an earlier day when
enshrined in the law remain to influence attitudes out of keeping with
the realities of modern life. The legal incidents of marriage giving
women a supposed right of support in exchange for domestic and sexual
services in the home, define woman's "true" role only as that of mother
and housekeeper, so that any work outside the home is seen as secondary
to woman's "real" function. As a consequence, women tend to define
their roles as home-related and do not aspire to outside employment ex-
cept where their earnings are necessary to the maintenance of home and
children. When women do seek outside employment they receive less
pay and are refused job accessibility because they are not by legal defi-
nition the breadwinners in the family. This is true even though thou-
sands of women are the heads of their households and thousands more
earn because the family needs their help.
It is well known that the women's liberation movement has casti-
gated the continuance of the "wife and mother" image to the exclusion
of all other self-concepts." 2  Rather than branding these statements as
extremist polemics, one must consider the facts. It is evident that con-
cepts solely of wife and mother are unrealistic today for the American
woman. First, the average woman today has a life expectancy of about
seventy-five years. She looks forward to more years of life than her
counterpart a century ago. Second, the average young woman of today
11 Paulsen, Support Rights and Duties Between Husband and Wile, 9 VAND. L REV.
709 (1956).
112 L. BALLARD, The Slave Women of America, The Revolution in THE WOMEN'S MOVn.
MENT (1969); E. BLAIR, Discouraged Feminists, in KRADITOR, UP FROM THE PEDESTAL
(1970); S. CRONAN, MARRIAGE (1970); R. GALIEN, WIVES' LEGAL RIGHTS (1967); K.
HORNEY, FEMININE PSYCI4OLOGY (1967); H. LANGHORST, MOTHERHOOD AND T-lU SUB.
ORDINATION OF FEMALES AND CHILDREN; E. REED, PROBLIEMS OF WOMEN'S LIBBRATION
(1971); K. STAMPP, THE PECULIAR INSTITUTION (1956); M. TAX, WOMAN AND HER
MIND: THE STORY OF DAILY LIFE (1970).
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expresses a desire to have only two children. Decreased infant mortal-
ity, the fears of population explosion, the lack of familial advantage from
many children that existed in a frontier and agrarian society, and the
relative effectiveness of birth control all combine to convert that desire
to fact. Having two rather than eight or ten children frees many years
of formerly full-time mothering and homemaking for other activities
which may be desired. Rather than most women expecting to devote
most of their lives to the child-rearing role, they find that that role now
consumes only a fraction of their total adult life span. Even if mothers
remain fulltime in the home until both children reach eighteen years, this
is only twenty years out of an expected fifty-seven years of adulthood,
leaving thirty-seven years without the responsibility of children. In addi-
tion to the technological revolution creating incentives for women to de-
velop careers outside the home, the prospect of thirty or forty years of
adult life free from the demanding motherhood role opens new vistas
for women. For the first time in history all women in this country can
see themselves in a role other than that of full-time mother and home-
maker.
It is time for the law to recognize that women do and will increasing-
ly play other roles in society." 3  The recognition that it is proper and
valuable to society for a woman to perform a role other than full-time
homemaker may contribute to the resolution of the modern woman s
identity crises." 4 The time has come to acknowledge that the "cherished
myths" of a woman's role exclusively as homemaker are so out of step
with reality that the law must cease fostering them. In the absence of
evidence that it is necessary for a furtherance of marital stability to con-
tinue the common law myth its divergence from reality is unjustified. We
must accord realistic legal recognition not only to the equal role that a
woman plays in the family in terms of childbearing and homemaking,
but also to the fact that she has other societal roles.
However, the failure to accord the wife and mother protection for
the support she needs during the -stage of her life while contributing to
11"'We are currendy witnessing a phenomenal increase in the numbers of mature women
returning to college and to the work force. See U.S. Dept. of Labor Women's Bureau, Con-
tinuing Education Programs and Services for lomen 1-8 (1971).
114 Clare Booth Luce maintains that women are having "identity crises all over the lot"
because "[Man is leaving woman emotionally, physically, and economically underemployed."
She says women "don't know who they are or what they are. They don't know what they are
good for anymore. They don't know where they are really needed, or what society expects
of them now... The awareness, conscious or unconscious, of women today that their tradition-
ally full-time roles of wife and mother are in a state of decline, and that no other roles are
open to them that promise them the same gratifications, is at the root of most of the restless-
ness, discontent, and psychological hang-ups they are experiencing." Luce, Woman: A Tech-
vological Castaway, 1973 BRITANNICA BOOK OF THE YEAR 24 at 28-29 (emphasis in
original).
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the family through vital child rearing and homemaking services or while
incapable of supporting herself due to the years devoted to those services
should not be ignored simply because in another stage of life the 'wife
may, indeed, be earning money. Neither should the ability to contribute
in the form of money be ignored because she produces none during other
stages of life. The current family law ineffectively and inequitably fo-
cuses exclusively on what has become a part-time role of most modern
women. Legal recognition is needed for both the marriage partnership
and the changing roles that both husband and wife can perform in that'
partnership. Women will never be accorded equality of opportunity and
equality of rights in society if law denies them that equality in the most
fundamental unit of society, the family.
III. EFFECT OF THE EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT
Family law remains one of the greatest strongholds of sex based gen-
eralizations and resultant sex discrimination. :It seems strange therefore
that in this area adoption of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA) would
have only mild impact. Ratification of the ERA would invalidate a state
right or obligation imposed solely on the basis of sex."' In the family law
area the ERA would require every state to recognize equal management
rights and family obligations in both husband and wife. The common
law concept of the husband-family, with the husband as head of the
household and the wife obligated to render household services would
be invalidated. The symbolic duty of support imposed by the common
law on the husband in favor of the wife would have to be modified un-
der the ERA so as to equalize family obligations. The Senate Judiciary
Committee's final report on the Equal Rights Amendment considered this
modification and defined support in functional terms which included non-
monetary contributions to the family. The report stated: "when one
spouse is the primary wage earner and the other runs the home, the wage
earner would have a duty to support the spouse who stays home in com-
pensation for the performance of her or his duties."110
Persons opposing the ERA suggest that rati fication of the amendment
will destroy the role of housewife and mother and will compel a woman
in the home to obtain an outside job. 1  They predict that married wom-
en will no longer have the right to remain in the home.118 Their fears
115 For a thorough discussion of the effects of the Equal Rights Amendment see Brown,
Falk, and Freidman, The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for Equal Rights
for Women, 80 YALE L J. 871 (1971).
116 S. REP. No. 92-687, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess. (1972).
317 See, e.g., Phyllis Schlafly Newsletter, Vol. 2 at 1 (August 1973).
118 This claim is based exclusively on a projected analysis by Professor Paul Freund, The
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are unjustified. In fact, a married woman living with her husband has
no such right now, unless her husband chooses to support her in that role.
If he does not, the only support which the courts might force him to pay
is support at a subsistence or welfare level under criminal support stat-
utes. And even this, the wife alone cannot compel.
Criminal non-support statutes which impose a criminal sanction only
on men who do not provide support would be invalid under the ERA. 1 '
A state legislature could enact a substitute non-support statute which
makes no distinction on the basis of sex, reworded in terms of failure of
a "person" who has a duty of support to perform that duty, rather than
using the word "man" or "husband." This form has been suggested by
the Committee to Draft a Modern Criminal Code for Missouri120 and
appears in the first general criminal non-support statute in the State of
Ohio, effective January 1, 1974.-121 In Pennsylvania a similar criminal
statute has been upheld under the state equal rights amendment. '  The
decision in the Pennsylvania case is especially important in that the court
recognized that a criminal statute in sex-neutral terms was permissible
even though it would probably be applied more frequently against men
than against women, due to the fact that men more often are wage earn-
ers while women provide their contribution to the family by working in
the home. This suggests that criminal prosecutions for nonsupport would
not change in effect under the ERA. Thus neither in the civil nor the
criminal law would the Amendment take from the full-time housewife
any legal right which she now has.
Unless modified, statutes allowing a creditor to recover from a hus-
band for "necessaries" or making the wife liable for her husband's
Equal Rights Amendment Is Not the Way, 6 HARv. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L REV. 234
(1971). Freund was writing about the ERA during the 91st Congress; he criticized the fact
that no definitive analysis of its effect on various types of state laws had been made and that
there was no legislative history on its effect. Freund confirmed in a telephone conversation
(Feb. 8, 1973) that he was only projecting possibilities and did not believe that the ERA
would necessarily require the result which the opponents claimed he stated.
Professor Thomas Emerson's article at 80 Yale L J. 871 (1971) supplied the missing
analysis and was heavily relied upon during the debates in the 92nd Congress by both pro-
ponents and opponents. Brown, supra note 115. That Congress is the one which passed
the ERA and its legislative history leaves no doubt that it was the intent of the Congress that
the wage earner should financiallly support the homemaker in compensation for homemaking
services.
119 Such statutes would likely be struck down by the courts rather than extended to impose
a similar sanction on women, because of their penal nature. Criminal or penal laws are
strictly construed and courts will generally not extend the application of a penal statute to a
new class of persons not covered in the legislation. See Brown, supra note 115 at 913 and
915.
120 Proposed Criminal Code for the State of Missouri § 13.040 (1973). See also MODEL
PENAL CODE § 230.5 (Prop. Off. Draft 1962).
121 See discussion at note 78 supra.
3-2 Lukens v. Lukens, 224 Pa. Super. 227, 303 A.2d 522 (1973).
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debts'23 and poor laws which place differing rights and duties of support
on husband and wife would be invalid under the ERA.12' These statutes,
as we have seen, provide little protection for the woman living with her
husband, and function to protect the coffers of creditors and state welfare
departments. The purposes of such statutes could be achieved on a sex-
neutral basis by enactment of broadened family expense statutes making
husband and wife jointly liable to the extent of their earnings and assets
to merchants for "necessaries" provided to members of the family unit.1 6
The fact that the ERA will have little impact on the legal rights and
obligations of the full-time housewife will provide reassurance to critics
of the amendment who fear it would undermine traditional family roles.
However, this same fact should be of concern to proponents of the ERA
who hope that the amendment may do more than give to women a sym-
bolic equality in the home.
In truth, the ERA will not increase the enforceable rights of a mar-
ried woman living with her husband. For the woman working in the
home the ERA will require legal concepts that function much like the tra-
ditional right of support, giving her a "right" of equality which in fact,
gives her no right to anything tangible or material. The ERA will not
overcome the reluctance of courts to become involved in the financial af-
fairs of a family. Therefore, a married person living with his or her
spouse will still be unable to enforce the right to support to which that
person is legally entitled. In other words, a woman working in the home,
married to a man employed outside the home, will still be able to obtain
only that level of support which he decides to give her. The income re-
mains his, in fact if not in law, and hers is to plead for her fair and right.
ful share. Equality is a hollow word with no means of enforcement.
IV. A PROPOSAL: THE PARTNERSHIP FAMILY MODEL
Affirmative legislation is needed to assure equality of rights to both
husband and wife living together in the home. Two philosophical ap-
proaches to such legislation are available.12  The first approach would
require that husband and wife be treated as individuals, as they are under
the law today, but that married women would be entitled to fair compen-
sation for their household services. This is generally the result which
would follow under the ERA in that a woman's services in the home
would entitle her to support from her husband. Further, the ERA would
123 See text at note 55 supra.
124 See text at note 73 supra.
125 See discussion in text and notes at notes 69 and 70 supra.
12 6 See Johnston, Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, The Law School Cur.
riculum, and Developments Toward Equality, supra note 7 at 1071.
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7equire that a married woman have the same property right as her hus-
)and to manage and control her earnings. Such equal treatment, how-
.ver, does not necessarily result in equality in fact. As one writer has
)ointed out:
However, if she spends her married life performing domestic services
for her family, she will have no earnings during that period nor the
prospect of making any when the marriage ends. The law's treatment of
her, although equal to that accorded her husband, does not put her on a
par with him-he, in fact, earns. Because she does not, the law should
give her something to compensate for this disparity-a share of his earn-
ings during marriage and a pension when it ends.127
The second alternative is to treat husband and wife, not as individ-
ials, but as a marital unit with each sharing equally in the burdens and
:ewards of the joint venture, including the net income generated by the
;ervices of either member of the unit. This alternative is the concept of
le partnership form of marriage and is the best design for achieving
:rue equality of husband and wife.
'What follows is a structural proposal of legal concepts to form the
asis of specific state legislation embodying the partnership family model.
rhe proposal is not intended as model legislation, since the precise legis-
lative format needs to be tailored for the enacting state. Instead the
proposal is a basic structure of legal ideas to establish equality in the
Family.
1. Husband and wife owe to the family created by their marriage
equal obligations of service.
2. Husband and wife are entitled to share equally in the manage-
ment and assets of the family created by their marriage.
3. All property acquired by either the husband or wife during the
marriage, except that which is the separate property of either, shall be
deemed the family property of the husband and wife and shall be subject
to their joint ownership, management, and control.
4. Separate property includes:
(a) That property of either spouse which he or she owned be-
fore the marriage;
(b) That property received individually by either spouse during
the course of the marriage by way of gift, inheritance or devise;
(c) That property which is the portion of the family's periodic
income set apart to each spouse as her or his separate property by
agreement of the spouses or, in the event the spouses fail to agree,
by court order upon a finding that individual ownership of such por-
127 Younger, Community Property, Women and the Law School Curriculum, 48 N.Y.U.L
Rev. 211, 213 (1973).
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tion of the family income is fair and equitable under all the circum-
stances.
5. The expenses of the family shall be chargeable by creditors upon
the property of the family and upon the separate property of. both hus-
band and wife, or either of them.
6. The legal rights and obligations of husband and wife in the man-
agement and property of the family are subject to alteration by contract.
When parties to a marriage recognized by the laws of this state enter into
a marriage contract, they may define their rights and obligations in the
family and in relation to the family property as they see fit, subject only
to the rights of creditors and the obligation of each parent to serve the
best interests of his children.
7. The rights and obligations of husbands and wives as they relate
to the control and ownership of family property are fully enforceable in
a court of law. No court shall refuse to enforce any of the property
rights created by law or any property rights arising out of a marriage con-
tract solely because husband and wife are cohabiting at the time suit is
brought.
Legislation based on this structure would introduce new elements into
the law of most states. Items similar to one and two are needed to remove
from the law vestiges of the common law concepts of merger, husband
as head of household, and wife's duty to render services to the husband.
They create a mutual obligation of service to the marital unit, the family,
whether it includes children or not. The term "service" is broad enough
to include financial and non-monetary contributions to the family, so that
a wage earning wife would have a duty to contribute to the family finan-
cially whereas the wife in the home could satisfy her obligation by her
services in the home. These items also recognize the equality of husband
and wife in the management of the marital unit and in sharing the re-
wards of the family.
Items three and four when read with the enforcement section, item
seven, are the heart of a new concept of enforcing tangible contributions
both to the marital unit and to each individual in the unit while the hus-
band and wife continue to live together. Item three states a principle
well known in community property states, but the enforcement section
creates a right to court enforcement during the marriage which now sel-
dom exists. It encompasses the situation of the wage earning husband
who gambles most of his paycheck away before he gets home on Friday
night, or of the working wife who might secrete her wages in a private
savings account. Court orders to bring the earnings into joint family
management and to expend them for family purposes could be enforced
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by wage assignments or punishment by contempt. No longer would Mrs.
McGuire have to suffer without a kitchen sink while her miserly husband
kept over $100,000 in bank accounts and bonds. This power would give
a non-wage earning homemaker, for the first time, an actual right to sup-
port.
Item four defines two categories of property as separate property as
they are defined in community property law, but it then creates a new
category. One objection to using community property law exclusively is
that if enforcement is permitted during the marriage, there is no recogni-
tion that each of the members of this marital unit are, indeed, individuals
-who ought to have some independent financial means if there are other-
wise adequate assets for family needs. In a business partnership, the
partnership agreement provides for the percentage of profits or amount
of income each partner is to have as his individual share, and if disagree-
ment arises the partnership is dissolved. In most marriages, especially
under a legal system that encourages private agreement, the spouses,
either formally or informally, would make a somewhat similar arrange-
ment. For those few families in which one partner has no incentive to
agree to an individual share for the other or in which the partners can-
not agree on an equitable amount but desire to salvage the marriage, the
law should provide incentive for private agreement and should provide a
resolution in lieu of contract. Courts should welcome the opportunity,
when a family member seeks court resolution, to help a family remain
together rather than to order its dissolution. In contrast to the business
partnership, the courts have long stated that the state has an interest in
preserving marriage. Consequently, legislation should provide a means
for preventing marriage dissolution in those occasional situations in
which one spouse is merely seeking a portion of the family income to
have at his or her individual disposal. Mrs. George should not be en-
couraged to have her husband prosecuted criminally because she resents
having to "ask for fifty cents." She should have an enforceable right to
obtain an equitable amount of the family income to dispose of as she
pleases.
Item five is essential to insure that the concept of family property does
not unfairly limit the rights of creditors.
A provision similar to item six is required to create a new right to de-
fine by marriage contract the rights and obligations between husband and
wife both in regard to the sharing and control of the assets of the mar-
riage and, also, in regard to the responsibilities and roles they should
each assume in managing and enjoying the family life. However, the
enforcement section, item seven, provides for enforcement only of those
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contract provisions and those laws which deal with property matters.
The criminal law could continue to punish failures to serve the family
including failure to support or care properly for children, but the civil
law should not become involved in attempts to force particular behavior
within the marital unit.
This proposed structure requires careful modification to fit the needs
of particular states, but it is presented here as a starting point for evalu-
ation of possible solutions to the twin problems of enforcing adequate
family support from its wage earners and according equality in legal
status to men and women in their marriage.
The partnership model with some modifications is the best design for
achieving equality in fact. This model makes the maintenance and pres-
ervation of the family unit the central theme for legal regulation of the
husband-wife relationship. The family idea which the law has held
sacred is the idea of the husband-family, where man has not only the
dominant role, but the only active role. The family partnership model
which is being advocated in this proposal, is that of a democratic family-
unit with husband and wife having equal roles.
The partnership model as a basis for family legislation would not
assign particular roles to husband and wife. For a workable and lasting
relationship, these decisions as to family roles should be made by the
parties to the marriage based on their individual skills and competence.
Law should not encourage a married woman to assume a traditional role
in the home, nor should it discourage her from being a full-time house-
wife and mother. It is the right of both women and men to choose their
roles in life that constitutes the essence of freedom and liberation. 12  Law
should not force husband or wife into a particular role, nor assign him
or her an unequal position once a particular role is assumed.
Robert Sedley expressed the point well:
Liberation means freedom. For a woman in American society today
this means that she will no longer by virtue of her sex be placed in a
societally subordinate role, that she will have her choice of life role, that
she will no longer be channeled into a societally perceived role of "wife
and mother." While many women will choose the "wife and mother"
role, those women who do not must have the same opportunity to maxi-
mize their life chances as do men. By the same token, a woman who
does choose the "wife and mother" role must not for that reason, be
disadvantaged or made subordinate to her husband.1"
In contrast to its laissez-faire approach to familial role-definition, the
12SSedler, The Legal Dimensions of Women's Liberatio: An Overvietv, 47 IND, L. 5.
419 (1972).
129 Id. at 419.
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)artnership model would define the property rights of husband and wife.
.n 1963, the Committee on Civil and Political Rights of the President's
..ommission on the Status of Women expressed approval of the partner-
hip model for the marriage relationship. The Committee concluded
hat during marriage each spouse should have a legally defined right in
he earnings of the other spouse and in the property acquired by such
arnings. Further, this policy should be implemented by appropriate
egislation.13
1. Criticism of the Partnership Family Model
Although the partnership family model has much support and seems
o be a logical and workable structure for the legal and social relation-
hip of husband and wife, it has received criticism from both sides of the
)olitical spectrum. Even today, when equality seems to be the watch-
vord of American democracy, there is a reluctance to allow equality in
he home and family. Some of the arguments for male dominance in
he home and family take the following forms.
First it has been contended that marriage is a sacrament and that laws
vhich would equalize the position of the parties to the marriage within
he ongoing family, substitute a business relationship for a sacred rela-
ion between husband and wife.13 . Ideally perhaps law should have no
ffect on the marriage relationship, which many see as a holy bond. How-
!ver, marriage laws which assign equal roles to husband and wife seem
nore in line with the Christian ethic than the male dominated family
;tructure supported by existing family laws.
Others contend that male dominance in the home and in society is
)art of the natural order of things. The claim is that the woman-wife
s naturally dependent on her husband because of her child-bearing func-
ion, i.e. female dependency is a phenomenon of biological differences.
ki recent study indicates that biological factors do have the potential for
letermining how dominant or submissive an individual, male or female,
zvill be.13' But the study revealed that the effect of this biological po-
:ential could only be detected in males. This implies that a woman's
;ocialization process, so completely ignores her individual attributes that
ier unique biological potential is not apparent. In other words, women
ire stereotyped by their upbringing in a submissive role, so that the bio-
130 REPORT OF COMMIITEE ON CIVIL AND PoLmcAL RIGHTS OF THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN (1963).
131W. DEFUNIAK, PRINCIPLES OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 3 at 7 (2nd ed. 1971);
tee Rey v. Rey, 279 So.2d 360 (Fla. 1973), and discussion supra note 43.
132 1. I. Gottman, Heritability of Personality: A Demonstration, in J. GARDNER, PROSPECr
WOMEN'S ROLE IN CONTEMPORARY SocIETY 109 (1970).
L974]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
logical differences which might create a dominant or submissive posture
are not reflected. Women are submissive, not because of biology, but
because of socialization. Women are not naturally dependent, but are
taught to be dependent by their fathers and their husbands.
A third argument for male supremacy in the home takes a more prac-
tical approach, somewhat reminiscent of the administrative convenience
arguments used to justify many types of discrimination.188 The argument
goes something like this: In the day-to-day affairs of married life differ-
ences of opinion arise. It will be much easier to settle these differences
if every disagreement doesn't involve a power struggle as well as resolu-
tion of the problem at hand. One party must win and one must relent.
The role of the law is to say which party has the upper hand. The law
assigns this position to the man because he is stronger and has more ex-
perience in decision-making. 4
Even apart from the assertion that man is the stronger and more ex,
perienced partner to the marriage, the argument outlined above rests on
a fallacious assumption-that there must be one dominant figure in the
marriage, one eternal head of the household. The natural arrangement
is a division of powers in the marriage with each partner being absolute
in the "executive branch of his own department." As Mill pointed out,
it is not necessarily practical and certainly not essential that all marital
decisions be made by any one person, and that that person always be the
husband.3 The division of power in the home should not and can not
be established by law since it depends on the special capabilities of tie
partners to the marriage.
A final rationale for preservation of the male dominated family model
is the spousal-protection theory: the argument that existing family and
support laws are necessary to "protect" women. 80 A closer look shows
that the real purpose of existing family laws is not to protect women,
but to keep them "in their place"; to preserve and reinforce the tradi-
tional male-dominated family model in which the husband earns and con-
trols all the income and the. wife remains in the home with no right to
138But see Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
184 J. BENTHAm, Principles of the Civil Code, 1 WORKS 355-56 (1838). See genrally
Johnston, Jr., Sex and Property: The Common Law Tradition, The Law School Currictlumn,
and Developments Toward Equality, 47 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1031, 1046-52 (1972).
135 J. S. MILL, The Subjection of Women, in ON LIBRTY AND OTlUR ESSAYS 195 (E,
Neff ed. 1926).
136 "1 vote against measures like the E.R.A. because I believe that a mother is more Im.
portant to most families than a father, and that women deserve the generally preferred status
which they now enjoy under the law of this state," Letter from Senator Paul L. Bradshaw
(Missouri Legislature) to the authors, April 16, 1973.
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compensation. 137 Both the common law and community property sys-
tems, under the guise of spousal-protection, encourage the woman to as-
sume her traditional role in the home by promising her a right of sup-
port. Outside employment is discouraged in more subtle ways, including
failure of the law to recognize a woman's ability to contribute to the
family maintenance and discriminatory tax treatment for working wives.
A criticism of the partnership model contrasting sharply with those
just discussed, is that a marital partnership imposes too many limits on
individual rights and freedoms. 138 The theory is that ideally persons
should be treated as individuals, and that marriage should be a personal,
not an economic relationship, between two persons.
This ideal was propounded almost forty years ago, by Professor R. B.
Powell:
Shall we adopt the rather characteristic tendency of our country and
of our time, to think dominantly in terms of money, of wealth, of things,
and embody the modern view of the equality of man and woman in a
pronunciamento that justice as between husband and wife consists in
the having of equal shares in all the "things" acquired during the mar-
riage through the efforts of either or both? Or shall we accept an ap-
proach simultaneously less mercenary and more individualistic, and regard
marriage as a sharing of experiences, not primarily concerned with
wealth, by two coordinate persons each of whom should be accorded by
law the power to acquire, to control and to dispose of such wealth as his
separate abilities may enable him to secure?18
Simone de Beauvoir put it another way:
137 See generally Kulzer, Property and the Family: Spousal Protection, 4 RuTGERs-CAM-
DEN L.J. 195, 214-17 (1973).
In a memorandum sent to "all persons interested in Missouri's ratification of the Equal
Rights Amendment" by Senator Richard M. Webtser (Missouri Legislature), Spring 1974,
the Senator states,
My essential objection is that the ERA must be applied absolutely. It dictates that
society may not choose whether or not to grant any privilege or to~treat differently,
husband or wife, or mother or father, no matter how justified the reason or com-
pelling the interest. Society does have a compelling interest in the protection and
stability of the family, and this fundamental interest justifies obligating husbands
and fathers to support their families and permits draft exemptions to mothers of de-
pendent children while fathers are drafted.
This memorandum concludes with the statement that allowing each individual "an equal
right to determine, live, and support his life within equitable laws as he sees fit" is, "a beauti-
ful concept which is absolutely necessary in every human relationship--except the family.
In my own view the demands for the stability of the family require that individual self fulfill-
ment be reasonably subjected to needs of the family."
The Senator assumes that equality of opportunity and equal obligations means irresponsi-
bility to the family. That is not true.
138 See generally Kulzer, Id. at 222-28.
139 Powell, Community Property-A Critique of its Regulations of Intra-family Relations,
11 WAsH. L. REv. 12, 15-16 (1936).
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The couple should not be regarded as a unit, a closed cell; rather
each individual should be integrated as such in society at large, where
each (whether male or female) could flourish without aid; then attach-
ments could be formed in pure generosity with another individual equal-
ly adapted to the group, attachments would be founded upon the
acknowledgment that both are free.140
The ideal advanced by Powell and de Beauvoir would have the mari-
tal relationship make no impact on property rights of husband and wife.
There would be no need for marital property laws, because the property
rights of the parties to the marriage relationship would remain unchanged
by that relationship. All forms of spousal protection would be removed,
leaving the law of property neutral on the point.
The ideal is workable only when both husband and wife may acquire
property independently. As has been illustrated by experience in com-
mon law property states where each spouse has a right to manage his or
her separate earnings, equality under the law is of little value when the
ability to acquire earnings is not equal. 141 Even when equal opportuni-
ties for employment and earnings are available to women, many married
couples may decide that one spouse should work in the home. In addi-
tion, pregnancy and post-natal childcare may make it necessary for some
women to spend periods of time unemployed and in the home. The law
should provide equality in fact and should protect equally the spouse
performing family obligations in the home.
The partnership model provides a workable resolution of the prob-
lems presented, in that it puts a minimum of restrictions on individual
freedom and does not influence or encourage the assumption of particu-
lar roles by husband and wife. On the other hand, the partnership model
provides protection to the spouse working in the home and for spousal
child-rearing. Thus a partnership model is the one structure which gives
a married woman freedom to have a career and establish an active role
in life outside the home, while giving adequate protection to the woman
who chooses to assume a traditional in-home role or to the woman who
is required to spend some part of her life in the home in child-rearing.
B. Community Property Theory-A Legal Basis for
Property Rights in the Partnership Family Model
The preceding proposal for the partnership family model adopts the
original philosophical concepts of the community property system as its
basis and attempts to build from that foundation of familiar legal con-
140 S. DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEx 479 (1953).
14 1 See supra note 127.
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cepts to create a new marital property system. Although the community
property system as it exists in the United States today, warped by decades
of judicial interpretation, will not achieve the results sought by this pro-
posal, the basic tenets of the system provide a structure of existing legal
concepts from which workable laws for regulation of the property rights
of partners to the marriage can be developed. Therefore, only the funda-
mental tenets of the community property system are adopted, and case
law construction and interpretation of these principles is generally re-
jected.
The main tenet of the community property system is equality. The
historical development of this equality concept was explained by De-
Funiak, tracing the development of the system back to the Visigothic
tribes:
In adopting the concept of a community of goods, the law was real-
istic. It had regard for the industry and common labor of each spouse
and the burdens of the conjugal partnership and community of interest.
With the feeling in mind that during marriage the time and attention
of husband and wife should be directed toward furthering the goals-
economic, moral, social--of the marriage, the community was instituted
as the most suitable vehicle for accomplishing these goals.
Thus the policy of community property was to establish equality be-
tween husband and wife in the area of property rights in marital prop-
erty acquisitions, in recognition of and to give effect to the fundamental
equality between the spouses based on the separate identity of each
spouse and the actual contribution that each made to the success of the
marriage. Note the striking difference between this and the common
law doctrine of the merger of the identity of the wife into that of the
husband.142
Historically, community property considered woman as an individual
and marriage a partnership in which both parties had obligations and
duties. Husband and wife, the partners to the marriage, were given the
right to share equally in the gains and acquisitions of the partnership
during its existence.
Although the underlying tenets of the community property system
are good, the system has not provided equality between husband and wife
in practice. Today the community property system may discriminate
against women more harshly than the common law system. For example,
under community property laws now in force in six of eight community
property states, a married woman's individual income becomes com-
munity property subject to the sole management and control of her hus-
band, so that she loses any right to share in the disposition of funds
142 DeFuniak, Principles of Community Property, supra note 131 at § 11.1.
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acquired by her individual efforts, 143 Thus, adoption of the existing com-
munity property system would not result in actual equality between hus-
band and wife.14
4
The advantages of community property concepts have been recog-
nized by many legal writers. Professor Robert Sedler made these com-
ments:
Under a community property system, each partner contributes his or
her efforts within the home or outside, or by a combination of both, to
the well-being of the marital enterprise. Each partner thereupon has the
right to share equally in the wealth acquired by the joint efforts....
Under a true system of community property, in which the manage-
ment would be entrusted to the partners jointly, many of the dependency
problems which accompany the present legal structure of marriage could
be eliminated. The contribution of the woman, if she chooges to stay
at home and take care of the children, would legally be considered the
equivalent of the man's. Secondly, the community property system
would be more conducive to an arrangement by which both partners
would share the household and child care responsibilities equally or by
which the wife would be the sole "breadwinner." It would enable the
parties to make their own arrangements concerning the contribution of
each to the marital enterprise, would equalize those contributions and
would eliminate any notion of "head of the household."' 14
Harriet Daggett pointed out another advantage of the economic part-
nership approach of the community property system:
Thoughtful -students of modern marriage have expressed the view
that the wife in the home should feel that her efforts are materially re-
warded. The sense of satisfaction derived from the fact of remuneration
would prevent, in cases where it is not necessary or desirable, the seeking
of outside employment in industrial areas and elsewhere with the con.
sequent dissatisfaction and disintegration of the family as a unit. Fur-
thermore, the wife who is unable to earn money outside of her home
would not have the feeling, despite her drudgery, of being a liability
rather than an asset. The husband and children are more apt to put a
higher estimate upon the efforts of the woman of the household if her
job is evaluated in terms of dollars and cents. She, in turn, has a greater
interest in conserving and augmenting the family finances and takes
greater responsibility in these matters. 146
143 See Younger, supra note 127 at 232.
144 For a general discussion of the limits of the community property system in practice
see Younger, supra note 127 at 212 and Kulzer supra note 137.
145 Sedler, subra note 127 at 431-32.
146 Daggett, Division of Property Upon Dissolution of Marriage, in SILECrEID ESSAYS ON
FAMILY LAW 1053, 1059 (1950).
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C. Role of Family Laws in Implementing the
Partnership Family Model
The proposal, having considered the soundness of the marital partner-
ship theory, defines the role of family laws as affecting only the property
rights of husband and wife and not their familial roles or relationships.
This partnership family model would establishes the family enterprise as
the point of primary concern, and should states the essential obligation
of husband and wife to serve the family. Paul Sayre made this point in
1943:
If ... we do nothing to assert a duty to each other in the case of
husband and wife and a duty in both of them to the family as a unity,
we... [impair] the most valuable elements of unity within the family
for all cultural life. The unit is now the family and duties of husband
and wife should be interpreted in terms of service to the family and
thereby of course, service to each other.' 47
Although law provides a model for the family structure and should
establish a basic relationship of equality and mutual service between hus-
band and wife, law should not attempt to dictate further the personal
social relationship of husband and wife. Family laws should not tell
husband and wife what roles each should perform in the family, or for
that matter, in the outside world. Such decisions should be made by the
parties to the marriage based on their particular interests and abilities.
In addition, family laws are not effective to compel the assumption of
the role of homemaker by the wife or breadwinner by the husband, but
merely make life more difficult for the woman or man who assumes a
non-conforming role.14 Law is not a workable tool and has been unsuc-
cessful in regulating social behavior, particularly in a relationship as fun-
damental and personal as marriage. Therefore, this proposal places on
husband and wife mutual obligations of service to the family, but does
not attempt the futile task of compelling the assumption of particular
roles to perform those obligations.
147 Sayre, supra note 110 at 875.
14 8 An empirical study conducted by Professors Jacobs and Angell in 1928 makes this point.
Over 1000 families in various part of New York were studied. The study determined that
in almost half'of the families where the husband was the sole wage earner, the wife had
some say in the administration of the husband's earnings, and in a higher number of the
families the spouses acted jointly in determining important family expenditures. This was
true, even though under the law of New York the wife had no legal right in her husband's
earnings, apart from her right of support. In addition, in the majority of the cases where the
wife was a wage earner, she retained control of her own earnings and often a part of her hus.
band's as well. Jacobs and Angell, supra note 100 as cited in FOOT, LEVY & SAUNDERS,
CASES AND MATERIALS ON FAMILY LAw 318 (1966).
This study illustrates that existing family laws do not reflect the way that most families
actually function today and points out that law has very little impact on this day to day func-
tion.
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Family law should not interfere with the social structure of the family
but should be restricted in its application to the area in which it is most
effective, regulation of the property rights of husband and wife. Laws
for assuring the right of both individuals to accumulate property either
jointly or separately should be in existence. Indeed, laws which establish
equitable marital property rights have been recognized as encouraging
marriage stability.14
D. Particular Duties and Rights Subject to Modification
Under the traditional view the legal incidents of marriage arise auto-
matically by operation of law upon entering the marital status and there-
fore cannot be altered by the parties to that relationship. Clearly some
rights and duties of husband and wife should be fixed absolutely by law,
as for example, the duty of parents to care and provide for their clil-
dren.150 The proposed legislation would achieve this by establishing a
narrow foundation of permanent legal obligations, designed primarily
to protect creditors and children, which would be beyond the control of
the parties.
However, in the absence of demonstrated justification for regulation,
certain other husband-wife relations should be determined by contract,
not by operation of law. The manner in which husband and wife per-
form their obligations to serve the family should be within their control,
For too long, the state has taken a paternal attitude in justifying the
state's invasion into the personal and private relationship of husband and
wife on a public policy theory. The theory is that the state has a valid
interest in marriage stability, and allowing the parties to the marriage to
decide and determine the legal incidents of their relationship will under-
mine that stability.' This reasoning is fallacious for it is doubtful that
the state can show that marriage agreements jeopardize any valid interest
of the state. Indeed, marriage agreements may well increase the stability
of marriage and the family. Marriage, at least in theory, is a lifelong
relationship. Husbands and wives who do seek to determine the legal
incidents of this gelationship by contract will necessarily have to consider
carefully the legal as well as the s6cial and moral obligations they owe
one another, and this in.turn, should encourage marital stability.
In any event, it is unreasonable to force upon husband and wife a set
of legal obligations which may be inappropriate for their relationship,
149 Daggett, supra note 146 at 1065.
350 See text at note 103 supra. See also, Comment, Marital Contracts Wrhich May be Put
Asunder, 13 J. FAM. LAW 23 (1973). For a discussion of the availability of antenuptial and
postnuptial contracts in community property states, see Younger, supra note 127 at 247.51.
151 Comment, Marital Contracts Which May be Put Asunder supra note 150 at 36-39.
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particularly when those obligations support no valid state interest. There-
fore, the proposed legislation affirmatively establishes the right of the
parties to delineate and modify their rights.
Once property rights and duties have been established, either by law
or contract, courts must provide enforcement. Traditionally, courts in
both common law and community property states have refused to step
into the ongoing marriage relationship to enforce the rights and obliga-
tions arising out of that relationship. Courts have been reluctant to make
orders they cannot enforce, and seem particularly hesitant to tell a hus-
band how he must spend his earnings when he has not "neglected" or
"deserted" his wife. Thus, the courts make support orders only when
they can no longer avoid the problem: when the marriage relationship
has broken down or when the state's coffers are being threatened because
a wife or child is not being provided with the bare necessities.
These justifications for the court's refusal to enforce support obliga-
tions owed to the wife do not stand up under close scrutiny. It is inter-
esting to note that the courts are not so reluctant to interfere with the
ongoing family relationship to enforce marital property rights of the hus-
band. In Wilcox v. Wilcox152 a wife secreted $30,000 in community
property funds and refused to return them to her husband, testing her
ownership interest against her husband's statutory right to manage the
funds. The husband sued to recover the funds and the appellate court
upheld his claim saying:
The right of the husband thus conferred to manage, control and dispose
of community personal property is invaded by his wife when she de-
prives him thereof by taking, secreting and exercising exclusive control
over community funds. A husband has a cause of action against his
wife for such an invasion and violation of his right in the premises with
attendant appropriate remedies.' 53
Once the law has intervened in the private area of the marriage rela-
tionship to establish property rights and obligations, the law cannot con-
sistently refuse to enforce the duties thus established on a theory that
law has no place in determining the day to day workings of the home.
Generally, married couples do not call on the courts to work out their
problems unless their private, extra-legal procedures break down. If the
courts are truly interested in marital stability and harmony, they should
intervene and assist husband and wife in solving their difficulties. This
approach is being taken by some states which have established family
courts to assist married couples in this way.
54
1_5Wilcox v. Wilcox, 21 Cal. App.3d 457, 98 Cal. Rptr. 319 (1971).
1.31,d. at 459, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 320. See Younger, supra note 127 at 235.
-a
4 See, e.g., N.Y. Family Ct. Act § 812 (McKinney 1963). See generally Dyson &
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In addition, a court's reluctance to intervene in the ongoing family re-
lationship to enforce the support rights thus established may be eased by
some aspects of this proposal. First, because the legal incidents of mar-
riage are based on a contract theory, rather than arising from the marriage
relationship, it is justifiable to assume that husband and wife have con-
sented to the terms of the marriage contract, a contract which they have
written themselves, or have accepted without modification as provided by
statute. Second, the enforceable duties and obligations of marriage re-
late only to the property rights of husband and wife and not to their
social relationship. Therefore, the courts will not find themselves in the
position of having to enforce contractual obligations relating to matters
such as intimate sexual behavior or household duties.
Conclusion
This survey compels the conclusion that the law of husband and wife
concerning management of the household and duties to render services
and support is ineffective to further family stability. The resultant in.
equality of legal status between husband and wife, is, therefore, a need-
lessly unjust and harmful condition. That inequality serves no purpose
other than to foster a model of family life unnecessary and largely out-
moded for our times. For a model that may increase family loyalty, fam-
ily cooperation, and family stability, we urge acceptance in the law of
every state of the partnership model for marriage and family. The pro-
posed legislation will (1)' establish equality of obligation to serve the
family; (2) permit contractual modification of the husband-wife rela-
tionship; and (3) provide for actual enforcement of the support rights
of husbands and wives while they live together. In this fashion we can
strengthen the family unit, accord equality to both spouses, and remove
the last great legal barrier to justice for women.
Dyson, Family Courts in the United States, 8 J. FAM. L. 505 (1968), 9 J. PAM, L. 1 (1969),
Cole, Family Cours-Their Nature and Function, 4 MAN. L J, 317 (1971); Paulgen, The
New York Family Court Act, 12 BUFF. L REv. 420 (1963); 39 FoRD. L. R. 530 (1971).
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